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ON DUOPOLY AND COMPENSATION GAMES IN 
THE CREDIT RATING INDUSTRY 
Robert J. Rhee 
ABSTRACT—Credit rating agencies are important institutions of the global 
capital markets. If they had performed properly, the financial crisis of 
2008–2009 would not have occurred, and the course of world history 
would have been different. There is a near universal consensus that reform 
is needed, but none as to the best approach. The problem has not been 
solved. This Article offers the simplest fix proposed thus far, and it is 
contrarian. This Article accepts the central role of rating agencies in the 
regulation of bond investments, the realities of a duopoly, and the issuer-
pay model of compensation. The status quo is the baseline. While not ideal, 
this much-maligned state is still well suited for robust competition leading 
to more accurate credit ratings. The role of regulation should be to create 
the conditions necessary to induce competition. This Article proposes that a 
small, recurring portion of revenue earned by the largest rating agencies 
should be ceded to fund a pay-for-performance bonus, and that the agencies 
should compete for this bonus on a periodic winner-take-all basis. This 
modest, at-the-margin bonding mechanism would significantly affect 
incentives and outcomes: conflict of interest and implicit coordination 
would be minimized; competition would increase; the quality of ratings 
would improve. Furthermore, this funding scheme can promote the 
incubation of smaller new competitors through a program of “shadow 
competition,” creating a competitive information market on credit ratings. 
Since regulation would only be required to assess performance and would 
not change the fundamental industrial organization, this proposal has the 
advantage of simplicity and feasibility. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Credit rating agencies are vital to the global economy. They assign 
credit ratings to bond issues and issuers, and most public bonds carry a 
credit rating, which is a probabilistic assessment of the risk of default. 
Credit ratings impact the price at which bonds are issued in their primary 
market and traded in secondary markets, and the assessment of risk in the 
portfolios of investors. These factors are directly linked to the regulation of 
bond investors such as banks, broker–dealers, insurers, and investment 
funds. 
Although rating agencies are some of the most important institutions 
of the global capital markets,1 they have long been criticized for providing 
inaccurate credit ratings.2 Some of their failures, like downgrading Enron’s 
debt to “junk” status only days before its bankruptcy filing, have been 
spectacular.3 These past lapses now seem like peccadillos when compared 
 
1 See generally HERWIG M. LANGOHR & PATRICIA T. LANGOHR, THE RATING AGENCIES AND 
THEIR CREDIT RATINGS: WHAT THEY ARE, HOW THEY WORK, AND WHY THEY ARE RELEVANT (2008) 
(providing an overview of the business of credit rating). 
2 See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the 
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999). 
3 Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1145, 
1145 (2003).  
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to the catastrophic failure to properly rate structured finance instruments4 
during the run-up to the financial crisis of 2008–2009. The narrative is well 
known and generally accepted. The systematic overrating of mortgage-
backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and other complex 
structured finance debt instruments inflated valuations and investor 
demand, reduced the perception of risk, and permitted wholesale 
investments in de facto junk bonds by regulated financial institutions that 
were required to invest only in “investment grade” securities.5 Like a 
pandemic, these overrated and overpriced “toxic” securities infected the 
balance sheets of many large financial institutions and triggered a global 
economic contagion. The financial crisis almost certainly would not have 
occurred had rating agencies performed properly.6 Rating agencies are 
important monitors of the global financial industry. The importance of their 
vigilance and the policy implications of their failure cannot be overstated. 
Reform of the credit rating industry is one of the most important 
unresolved agendas of post-financial crisis market regulation. Congress, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the securities industry, and 
scholars are actively scrutinizing the problem. With the recent explosion of 
commentary and analysis by scholars7 and government agencies8 seeking to 
 
4 The basic attribute of structured finance is the creation of securities through financial engineering, 
which is required because the issuer’s financing needs require a “tailor-made product or process.” 
FRANK J. FABOZZI, HENRY A. DAVIS & MOORAD CHOUDHRY, INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURED 
FINANCE 1 (2006). 
5 See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 74–78 (defining “junk” and investment grade bonds). 
6 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED 
STATES xxv (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (“This crisis could not have 
happened without the rating agencies.”); see also Lawrence J. White, The Credit-Rating Agencies and 
the Subprime Debacle, 21 CRITICAL REV. 389, 396 (2009) (“It is clear that the credit rating agencies 
were at the center of the subprime debacle.”). 
7 See, e.g., Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry, 13 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 253 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 231, 234 (2011); Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, IV & Chris Sagers, Faith-Based 
Financial Regulation: A Primer on Oversight of Credit Rating Organizations, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 557 
(2009); Mark J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable 
Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2010); Claire A. Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank’s 
Rating Agency Reform, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 133 (2011); Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004); Claire A. Hill, Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies After 
Enron?, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 283 (2009); Claire A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job 
Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585 (2010); John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating 
Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, 
and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109; Yair Listokin & Benjamin 
Taibleson, If You Misrate, Then You Lose: Improving Credit Rating Accuracy Through Incentive 
Compensation, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2010); Lois R. Lupica, Credit Rating Agencies, Structured 
Securities, and the Way Out of the Abyss, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 639 (2009); Timothy E. Lynch, 
Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment, 
59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227 (2009); Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 749 (2013); Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User 
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shape the ultimate reform, the sense of urgency for reform of the credit 
rating industry is palpable. Proposals include promoting more competition 
among rating agencies, imposing greater civil liability, changing rating 
agency compensation structures from issuer-pay to user-pay models, and 
substituting credit ratings with market metrics. 
Although we do not have a consensus on the fix,9 the problem has 
been identified. In the Sarbanes–Oxley Act,10 Congress first acknowledged 
the problem of rating agencies as they related to the corporate governance 
and accounting failures of the era. In the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), Congress again 
recognized the problem of rating agencies as they related to the financial 
crisis.11 In this eight-year legislative arc, a consensus has formed that the 
core problem is the relationship between compensation and incentive. This 
is seen in the Dodd–Frank Act, which requires studies of “alternative 
means for compensating nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations that would create incentives for accurate credit ratings.”12 In 
singling out compensation for study, Congress correctly recognized the link 
among compensation, incentive, and quality of credit ratings. It has 
 
Fee Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1011 (2009); Frank Partnoy, 
Historical Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: Ivar Kreuger, the Credit-Rating Agencies, and Two 
Theories About the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 431 (2009); Joseph A. 
Grundfest & Evgeniya E. Hochenberg, Investor Owned and Controlled Rating Agencies: A Summary 
Introduction (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 66, 2009; Stanford Univ. Law 
Sch. Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 391, 2009), available at papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1494527. 
8 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-240, CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: 
ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION MODELS FOR NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING 
ORGANIZATIONS (2012) [hereinafter GAO 2012 REPORT]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2011 
SUMMARY REPORT OF COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF EACH NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED 
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATION [hereinafter SEC SEPT. 2011 REPORT] (as required by Section 
15E(p)(3)(C) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 
ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS (2011) [hereinafter SEC JAN. 
2011 REPORT] (as required by Section 6 of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-782, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: ACTION NEEDED 
TO IMPROVE RATING AGENCY REGISTRATION PROGRAM AND PERFORMANCE-RELATED DISCLOSURES 
(2010) [hereinafter GAO 2010 REPORT]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND 
FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS (2003) 
[hereinafter SEC REPORT ON ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT AGENCIES] (as required by Section 
702(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002). 
9 A number of commentators have previously provided thoughtful critiques of these reform 
proposals, and their strengths, weaknesses, and feasibility have been well analyzed. See, e.g., Coffee, 
supra note 7, at 251–71 (providing an overview of the reform choices); Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra 
note 7, at 592–608 (same). 
10 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745. 
11 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872–90 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 
U.S.C.). 
12 Id. § 939F(b)(4), 124 Stat. at 1889; see also id. § 939D(a), 124 Stat. at 1888 (requiring GAO to 
study “alternative means for compensating . . . to provide more accurate credit ratings”). 
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signaled a willingness to reform the compensation scheme for credit rating 
agencies and has already given the SEC significant authority to regulate 
compensation,13 but thus far there has been no feasible reform proposal.14 
This Article responds to Congress’s clarion call to resolve this essential 
problem of industrial organization.15 It proposes a simple, contrarian 
solution to positively link compensation and incentive. 
Unlike all other reform proposals, my proposal accepts the status quo 
of the much-maligned industry organization as a baseline reality. This 
Article does not argue for fundamental reconfiguration of the industry or 
regulation. It leaves intact the role of the major rating agencies in the 
regulation of financial institutions and investment portfolios. It assumes the 
continued existence of a duopoly and accepts the much-criticized issuer-
pay model, in which the issuer of the debt security pays for the rating. With 
the luxury of starting from scratch, these conditions may not be the ideal 
model,16 but the world is imperfect and wishful thinking is not a policy 
proposal. In proposing concrete reforms, the pragmatist should 
acknowledge the realities of a preexisting multi-billion dollar credit rating 
industry and a $150 trillion credit market17 that depends heavily on credit 
ratings. From a regulatory-feasibility perspective, the simplest path forward 
requires the least amount of structural change to large, complex institutions 
and capital markets; and perhaps this counterintuitively leads to the most 
effective reform. 
The basic problem is this: industry concentration coupled with the 
issuer-pay model reduces the incentive to compete and perform. Since 
incentive is the condition necessary to induce competition, the problem can 
be fixed by implementing a structured compensation scheme overlaid onto 
the issuer-pay model. The simplest solution is to establish a mandatory 
pay-for-performance compensation scheme in which a fixed percentage of 
accrued revenue is ceded to fund a performance bonus. At periodic 
intervals, the regulator should award the bonus to the best performing 
rating agency for the period on a winner-take-all basis. Proper incentive is 
achieved through mandatory participation in a compensation competition. 
This idea requires minimal regulatory intrusion into the industry. The 
 
13 See id. § 939F(d), 124 Stat. at 1888. 
14 See infra Part I.D (identifying the problems with the current proposals). 
15 See Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 565 (noting that the problem is one of industrial 
organization). Industrial organization is the branch of economics dealing with the structure of industries 
and the behavior of firms in the market. DONALD RUTHERFORD, ECONOMICS: THE KEY CONCEPTS 114–
15 (2007). 
16 See Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, supra note 7, at 84 (“The concentrated market 
structure in the rating agency industry and the barriers to entry clearly cause some deviations from the 
‘ideal’ of a fully competitive market.”). 
17 See CHARLES ROXBURGH ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., MAPPING GLOBAL CAPITAL 
MARKETS 2011, at 3 (2011) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT], available at http://www.mckinsey.com/
Insights/MGI/Research/Financial_Markets/Mapping_global_capital_markets_2011 (data as of 2010). 
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proposal benefits from simplicity, administrability, and economic 
feasibility. It can fundamentally reform the industry with minimal 
disruption, even though the rating agencies themselves may not like it. 
Part I explains the problem in the industrial organization, describes the 
regulatory responses, and briefly summarizes prior reform proposals. 
Part II sets forth the proposal, including issues related to implementation. 
After establishing the basic scheme, it offers a glimpse of the next step in 
the evolution of a more robust market for credit ratings, which is the 
creation of a competitive information market for credit ratings through a 
program of “shadow competition” among a broader cohort of rating 
agencies. Part III discusses the obstacles to implementing the proposal. It 
argues that the potential problem of collusion and the difficulty of 
formulating a standard for assessment are not insurmountable impediments. 
Instead, the politics of Wall Street regulation constitute the most 
formidable challenge to implementation.18 
 
18 The scope of my analysis is limited to advancing the conceptual framework of the regulation and 
demonstrating its feasibility. This Article does not provide a detailed constitutional analysis of the 
proposal, but I note a few factors that may be relevant in such an analysis. Credit rating agency reform 
obviously involves the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce as it did in enacting the 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010. The proposal here can be 
couched as a condition of receiving a regulatory license from the SEC. It could be structured as a fee, 
refundable upon demonstration of performance. It could be structured as a tax with a back-end 
monetary incentive. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–601 (2012) 
(holding that the individual mandate to purchase health insurance of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 171–74 (1992) (holding that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act’s monetary and 
access incentive provisions, including the awarding of collected surcharges, were valid). While the 
proposal may have in mind the three specific firms that currently dominate the credit rating market, it 
could be couched in neutral language with regulation addressing only the largest firms: for example, 
firms having market share in credit ratings of 10% or more. This would capture only the duopoly of 
Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s) and Standard & Poor’s rating service (S&P), plus Fitch Ratings 
(Fitch), since the other SEC-designated nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) 
collectively have about 3% of the market share. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. 
Supp. 2d 987, 1022 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting “Discount Superstore” 
with specific characteristics did not violate equal protection or dormant commerce principles); Retail 
Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 501 (D. Md. 2006) (holding that a state statute 
requiring employers of specified criteria that spend less than 8% of total wages on health insurance to 
pay the difference to the state did not violate equal protection). Any legislative or regulatory proposal 
may invoke the Commerce Clause, taxing power, due process, equal protection, and neutrality 
principles, as the enactment of meaningful regulation such as the Dodd–Frank Act or the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act would. This Article is limited to setting forth the compensation scheme to optimize 
performance from an economic and game theory perspective. 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF PRIOR PROPOSALS 
A. The Bond Market and the Credit Rating Industry 
Long-term debt and equity fund the long-term capital needs of 
corporations.19 In 2010 the global bond market had outstanding bonds of 
$108 trillion, as compared to the equity market of $54 trillion.20 This ratio 
of debt to equity is not surprising. Academic theories in corporate finance 
support the view that debt, when properly used, can be value enhancing.21 
There is a “pecking order” in external financing, and firms prefer to issue 
the least risky securities first, which is debt.22 The credit market is 
enormously important to the global capital markets and the smooth 
functioning of a market economy. 
Publicly traded bonds are rated.23 A credit rating is necessary because 
many financial institutions, the primary investors of bonds, are limited in 
the amount of risk they can assume in their portfolios. A credit rating is an 
opinion provided by a rating agency for a fee24 on the credit risk or 
creditworthiness of the bond issue, which reflects the probability of default 
of that bond.25 It places the issue or issuer on an ordinal scale of credit 
ratings. Among the major rating agencies, their alphanumeric rating scales 
are very similar. The major taxonomical division in ratings is between 
“investment grade” and “speculative grade,”26 and within each are finer 
divisions of ratings.27 Importantly, a credit rating is not an opinion on the 
 
19 See ROBERT J. RHEE, ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS OF BUSINESS FOR LAWYERS 231–32 (2012). 
20 MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 17, at 2. These figures do not include nonsecuritized bank loans, 
which add another $49 trillion in outstanding debt. Id. 
21 See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 418–33 (10th ed. 2011); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); 
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A 
Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963). 
22 BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 462. 
23 LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 23; Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, supra note 7, 
at 46–48. 
24 The typical fee for a corporate bond issue is in the range of 4–5 basis points. LANGOHR & 
LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 413. Because structured finance instruments are more complex, the fees are 
generally higher. Id.; SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 22. One basis point is 1/100th of a 
percent, and thus 100 basis points equals 1%. The finer division represented by basis points is necessary 
in some areas of finance, particularly bonds. 
25 See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 24 (providing definitions from the three leading 
rating agencies). “The term ‘credit rating’ means an assessment of the creditworthiness of an obligor as 
an entity or with respect to specific securities or money market instruments.” Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006 § 3(a)(60), Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327, 1328. 
26 Bonds in this latter category are called “junk” or “high-yield” bonds. 
27 For investment grade, S&P and Fitch provide these ordinal ratings: AAA, AA+, AA, AA–, A+, 
A, A–, BBB+, BBB, BBB–. Moody’s rates the same categories with slightly different nomenclature: 
Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3. Ratings continue with speculative-grade ratings of 
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value of the bond.28 Like the value of stocks, the value of bonds may 
depend on a number of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. A credit rating 
obviously affects value: higher rated bonds should be priced higher and 
offer lower yields, and vice versa. But the value of a bond also incorporates 
other market factors such as the prevailing interest rate environment, 
macroeconomic factors, and transitory financial market movements, all of 
which may move bond prices and yields as well as yield spreads among 
classes of bonds. However, value and creditworthiness are distinct. A credit 
rating is an opinion only on the probability of default, the essence of 
creditworthiness.29 
While rating agencies provide opinions in private transactions, they de 
facto regulate investments and serve a public gatekeeping function.30 The 
use of credit ratings has been pervasive in regulation of investments.31 An 
example is the regulation of bank capital, which among other things 
employs credit ratings.32 Another example is Rule 2a-7 of the Investment 
Company Act, which provides that a money market fund shall “present 
minimal credit risks” as may be determined by credit rating.33 Still another 
example is the use of ratings to regulate the investment portfolios of 
insurance companies.34 The financial crisis has proved that the network of 
information intermediation among issuers, investment bankers, rating 
agencies, and investors imparts externalities on the broader society. Thus, 
credit ratings are a public good.35 
The credit rating industry is highly concentrated.36 The three largest 
rating agencies are Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s), Standard & 
 
BB+ and Ba1, going down to C and D levels. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 47, 74–78 
(describing ordinal rankings). Bonds rated below BBB– and Baa3 are junk bonds. Id. at 44–45. 
28 Id. at 64–72. 
29 Id. at 24. 
30 Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 934 (1998); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. 
L. REV. 301, 302 (2004). 
31 See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 430–39. As of March 5, 2013, a Westlaw search of 
the term “investment grade” produced 524 hits in state statutes and administrative regulations 
databases, and 115 hits in C.F.R. and U.S.C. databases. The term “Moody’s or Standard /2 Poor!” 
produced 879 hits in state statutes and administrative regulations databases, and 90 hits in C.F.R. and 
U.S.C. databases. 
32 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A (2013); id. pt. 225, app. G; id. pt. 1750, subpt. B, app. A; see also SEC 
JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 11–12 (noting the incorporation of the concept of “investment 
grade” in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act as well as other federal statutes and regulations). 
33 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2012). 
34 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-544 (2002) (providing that an insurer may invest in bonds 
“which have received an investment grade rating”). 
35 See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 429 (“It is clear that today’s CRA industry presents 
plenty of public interest externalities.”). 
36 See SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 6–7. Economists measure market concentration 
using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, “calculated by squaring the market share of each firm 
competing in the market and then summing the resulting number.” Id. Based on this calculation, the 
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Poor’s Rating Service (S&P), and Fitch Ratings (Fitch). As of 2010, the 
market shares based on the number of ratings provided are: S&P 42%, 
Moody’s 37%, Fitch 18%, and the other seven SEC-designated nationally 
recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) add up to about 3%.37 
Together, Moody’s and S&P are typically seen as a duopoly or partner-
monopoly,38 but this status is not quite correct because Fitch is a smaller 
but significant third competitor. The industry is somewhere between a 
duopoly and an oligopoly. In this paper, I call this arrangement a “duopoly 
plus” to reflect that Moody’s and S&P have dominant market shares but 
Fitch cannot be ignored. 
B. Poor Performance and Its Causes 
Systemic poor performance of rating agencies poses deep problems of 
public policy and economics. Most recently, rating agencies systematically 
overrated highly speculative structured finance securities backed by 
mortgages underwritten during the housing bubble.39 The results were 
catastrophic. By 2010, over 90% of the subprime mortgage-backed 
securities issued between 2006 and 2007 with triple-A ratings had been 
downgraded to junk bonds by Moody’s and S&P.40 This 90% error rate is 
breathtaking for an industry that rates bonds on very fine ordinal grades. 
During this period, rating agencies engaged in egregiously lax and 
irresponsible business practices, and there was a systematic failure of due 
diligence by the entire industry.41 If rating agencies had rated these 
securities as junk bonds, the financial crisis would not have occurred 
 
HHI for the credit rating industry is 3495, implying that there are approximately 2.86 equally sized 
firms, which approximates the actual duopoly plus state of the industry. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.3, at 19 (2010) (indicating 
that a score of 3495 is a highly concentrated market). 
37 SEC SEPT. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. This high level of concentration has been a 
historical fact of the credit rating industry. SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 11. 
38 SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 10–11; JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE 
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 284 (2006); Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 569–
70. 
39 Coffee, supra note 7, at 236–41; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 581 & n.89. 
40 Eric S. Pendergraft, Section 933(b): Nimble Private Regulation of the Capital Market 
Gatekeepers, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511, 515 (2012). In 2006, Moody’s assigned triple-A ratings on 
thirty mortgage-related securities per day, and 83% of these securities were ultimately downgraded. 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 6, at xxv. For a definition of junk bonds, see supra 
notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
41 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 242–46 (providing account and analysis). Recently, the U.S. 
Department of Justice sued Standard & Poor’s for fraud related to the latter’s ratings of mortgage-
related bonds during the financial crisis. Complaint for Civil Money Penalties and Demand for Jury 
Trial, United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. CV13-00779 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013); see also Mary 
Williams Walsh & Andrew Ross Sorkin, U.S. Accuses S.&P. of Fraud in Suit on Loan Bundles, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at A1. In this complaint, the United States avers that S&P engaged in a scheme to 
defraud investors. Complaint, supra, § VI, at 28–115. 
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because investor demand would have collapsed due to regulatory 
restrictions on investments, thus breaking the securitization pipeline that 
fueled the housing bubble. 
The problems of the credit rating industry have many causes. 
Commentators have well documented the major factors, which have been 
generally accepted as the cause of the problem. The following is a 
summary of their findings and analyses. 
1. Conflict of Interest.—Rating agencies are said to have an inherent 
conflict of interest arising from the issuer-pay fee structure,42 which is the 
predominant form of compensation in the credit rating industry.43 The 
issuer pays the fee for the credit rating service, rather than the bond 
investor or a subscriber to rating information. Since a high rating reduces 
the issuer’s cost of debt, the potential for a conflict of interest is obvious. 
Issuers and investment bankers, the argument goes, can “shop” for ratings, 
and this competition for business can compromise the objectivity of rating 
agencies.44 With that said, the conflict of interest argument is more nuanced 
as there is a counterargument. The issuer-pay model is not unique to rating 
agencies, as accountants, lawyers, investment bankers, and consultants are 
also paid by issuers.45 And, since obtaining multiple ratings per issue is the 
standard market practice, issuers may not really have leverage,46 or the 
leverage may be weak at best. Empirical evidence indirectly supports this 
point as fees for credit ratings have significantly increased from 2001 to 
2007, suggesting that, at least with respect to pricing, issuers did not have 
the “shop elsewhere” leverage against rating agencies.47 
2. Lack of Competition.—Rating agencies do not compete so much 
as they coexist in a profitable market.48 There are three reasons that 
competition is lacking. First, the market is heavily concentrated, thus 
reducing competiveness. Market concentration “permits these nominal 
 
42 See SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 16–17, 19; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 
582; Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 7, at 99; Lupica, supra note 7, at 662. Some commentators have 
also suggested that individual credit analysts have conflicts of interest arising from employment 
opportunities with issuers or investment banks. See Jess Cornaggia et al., Revolving Doors on Wall 
Street (Mar. 22, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2150998. 
43 As of 2011, seven of the ten NRSROs operated under the issuer-pay model, and the issuer-pay 
model constituted approximately 99% of the total outstanding credit ratings issued by NRSROs. SEC 
JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. The NRSROs appear to be trending even more toward the issuer-
pay compensation model. SEC SEPT. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 9. 
44 Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 586; Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 7, at 99. 
45 Coffee, supra note 7, at 255. 
46 COFFEE, supra note 38, at 286. 
47 LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 414; see also infra note 192 (noting that Warren Buffett 
invested in Moody’s because of its pricing power). 
48 Coffee, supra note 7, at 231; see also Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank, supra note 7, at 146 (“What is 
needed in the moderate term is vigorous competition.”). 
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competitors to shirk, engaging in less effort and research than if there were 
true active competition.”49 Second, competition is further muted by the 
industry custom of obtaining multiple ratings from different rating 
agencies.50 The vast majority of new bond issues carry multiple ratings.51 
Quite literally, then, the competition among firms can be characterized as 
typically “win–win.” Third, there are no really good substitutes for a credit 
rating. Although bond investors frequently conduct analysis of bonds 
independent of credit ratings, the regulatory facet of a credit rating is 
difficult to substitute. These aspects of rating agencies ensure a level of 
sustained business irrespective of quality. 
3. Ineffectiveness of Reputation Capital.—Reputation capital does 
not sufficiently incentivize performance. In a competitive market, 
reputation capital may ensure a certain level of quality and incentive, but it 
does not incentivize performance well when two firms have cornered the 
market for a necessary service.52 One would think that after the failures 
related to the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the reputations of rating 
agencies would have been damaged, but the businesses of Moody’s and 
S&P have not been hurt by reputational concerns in the wake of the 
financial crisis. They are enjoying healthy profits. For example, after the 
financial crisis, Moody’s net income has continued to grow significantly: 
$402 million (2009), $507 million (2010), $571 million (2011), and $690 
million (2012).53 The 2012 earnings are almost at the same level Moody’s 
achieved in 2007 ($701 million), at the apex of the credit bubble and rating 
agency revenues.54 At least for the moment, the profitability of the major 
rating agencies is primarily a function of market environment and 
investors’ appetite for fixed income securities, which dictate the demand 
for rating services.55 Only Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch are large enough to 
 
49 COFFEE, supra note 38, at 285. 
50 See id. at 286 (noting the “well-established norm that two ratings are necessary”). 
51 See COFFEE, supra note 38, at 286; LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 54; Fitzpatrick & 
Sagers, supra note 7, at 569 & n.38. In a 1999 survey of issuers, 97.4% bought credit ratings from 
multiple rating agencies: “[a]bout three-quarters hire[d] two rating agencies and one-fifth hired three or 
more” rating agencies. LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
52 See Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 582 (“While it is commonly argued that they will 
thereby be penalized when the poor quality of their information is disclosed, that argument presumes 
competitive markets.”). 
53 Moody’s Corp., Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2012 (Form 10-K), File No. 
001-14037, at 65 [hereinafter 2012 Moody’s Corporation Form 10-K]; Moody’s Corp., Annual Report 
for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2011 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-14037, at 64 [hereinafter 2011 
Moody’s Corporation Form 10-K]. 
54 Moody’s Corp., Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2007 (Form 10-K), File No. 
001-14037, at 46. 
55 See SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that the market share of rating agencies 
in structured finance has not declined despite the systemic failure of the leading rating agencies in this 
sector, but that the overall market demand for asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities has 
declined due to the lack of investor confidence in the integrity of these securities). 
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meet the aggregate demand of the bond market. Most scholars have been 
skeptical that reputation alone optimally incentivizes quality performance.56 
4. Larger Perspective on Reputation Capital.—Reputation capital 
does not depend on only historical instances of large, egregious errors. It is 
based on a collection of factors. It incorporates a rating agency’s past 
record of good performance, adequacy of resources to provide ratings 
across an enormous bond market, and longevity and history of the firm. 
“Economies of scale and sunk costs may be economic factors which may 
favor the larger, more established rating agencies.”57 Commentators have 
suggested that there are important first-mover advantages58 and reputational 
“stickiness”59 that have enduring competitive benefits. These factors are 
highly relevant to reputation, though critics of rating agencies sometimes 
fail to credit them. Even if the three rating agencies performed poorly, their 
overall reputations may still be better than those of their competitors in the 
eyes of issuers. 
5. Regulatory Barriers.—Regulatory barriers also protect rating 
agencies from competitors. Financial regulators require institutional 
investors and broker–dealers to obtain credit ratings for debt securities in 
their investment portfolios for the purpose of prudential-based regulation of 
investment activities and risk bearing.60 However, fearing fly-by-night 
rating agencies, the SEC has parsimoniously granted the NRSRO status.61 
This regulatory philosophy effectively froze out new rating agencies from 
the market for credit ratings.62 These regulatory barriers have protected the 
duopoly plus structure, stifled competition among rating agencies, and 
diminished the importance of reputation capital. Nominally, these 
regulatory barriers have been somewhat lowered due to the liberalization of 
 
56 See Bai, supra note 7, at 270; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 589–90; Hunt, supra note 7, 
at 155–81; Manns, Rating Risk, supra note 7, at 1048–50. But see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private 
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (“Rating 
agencies are already motivated to provide accurate and efficient ratings because their profitability is 
directly tied to reputation.”). 
57 SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 12. 
58 See COFFEE, supra note 38, at 284 (“Logic suggests that there should be a significant barrier, 
because reputational capital cannot be acquired overnight.”); Coffee, supra note 7, at 248 (“Overall, this 
pattern suggests that there are important ‘first mover’ advantages because reputational capital is hard to 
acquire and goes to the first firms in the field. If licensing power alone could explain the dominance of 
the Big Three, then the newer members of the SEC’s NRSRO club should be sharing in a collective 
oligopoly.”). 
59 See Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job, supra note 7, at 604 (“Thus, it would 
seem that even if no rating agency had a regulatory license, stickiness might keep investors with the 
major agencies even regardless of disastrous performance.”). 
60 Coffee, supra note 7, at 246–47. 
61 Id. at 247; White, supra note 6, at 391–92. Section 4 of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006 required rating agencies that desired the NRSRO status to be registered with the SEC. 
62 White, supra note 6, at 392. 
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the NRSRO license procurement process.63 There are now eleven 
NRSROs.64 However, the major NRSROs continue to receive regulatory 
rent.65 
6. Natural Barriers.—Aside from regulatory barriers, newer and 
smaller rating agencies confront natural barriers to market entry. Large 
rating agencies provide broad coverage of the bulk of the global capital 
market, which includes an enormous credit market (over $150 trillion),66 
and systematize credit information through a similar, if not uniform, set of 
credit ratings. This information platform is important to investors and 
regulators. There is a positive network effect to size and scale—i.e., one 
cannot discount the benefit of having the broad spectrum of bonds and 
issuers in the very large credit market be rated under presumably a 
common methodology of firms that can handle such a large task. Newer 
and smaller rating agencies are disadvantaged because they lack this broad 
capability. Because they are smaller and have less financial resources, they 
also cannot compete as well for professional talent. And, if they do 
compete with the larger rating agencies, the latter could simply buy out the 
competition to maintain the current state of industry concentration, unless 
the M&A market is proscribed by law.67 Forces stronger than the SEC’s 
ability to grant more NRSRO licenses are at work in perpetuating an 
uncompetitive industry.68 
 
63 See infra Part I.C. 
64 They are HR Ratings de México, S.A. de C.V., Egan-Jones Rating Company, Realpoint LLC, 
LACE Financial Corp., A.M. Best Company, Inc., DBRS Ltd., Fitch, Inc., Japan Credit Rating Agency, 
Ltd., Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., Rating and Investment Information, Inc., and Standard & Poor’s 
Ratings Services. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”), U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm (last visited Nov.  
21, 2013). The SEC’s website has the commission orders granting each rating agency its NRSRO 
status. Id. 
65 See RUTHERFORD, supra note 15, at 181 (defining “economic rent” as “a return aris[ing] from 
the factor of production being in short supply”). 
66 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
67 That Moody’s and S&P would defend their competitive position is certain. Indeed, Moody’s has 
explicitly stated its strategy: “Moody’s will make investments to defend and enhance its core businesses 
in an attempt to position the Company to fully capture market opportunities resulting from global debt 
capital market expansion and increased business investment spending.” 2012 Moody’s Corporation 
Form 10-K, supra note 53, at 12. It is easy to see how Moody’s and S&P could acquire competitive 
threats as a part of corporate strategy. 
68 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 248 (“This continuity suggests that the Big Three’s dominance 
cannot be adequately explained by the regulatory powers the SEC allocated to them under its NRSRO 
system, as their market power both preexisted and survived the period in which they alone had licensing 
power.”); Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 570 (“But it seems likely that even if NRSRO rules 
were to be repealed, entry now would be severely impeded by the need to establish reputation as a 
seasoned CRO.”). 
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7. Complexity of Modern Finance.—The complexity of modern 
financial markets has increased significantly.69 For much of their history, 
rating agencies analyzed plain vanilla corporate bonds of issuers whose 
capital structure was composed of debt and equity.70 While the technical 
aspects of credit analysis can certainly be quite complicated and large 
errors occur (e.g., the case of Enron), much of this analysis can be done 
through fundamental analysis of financial statements.71 In the past several 
decades, credit analysis has become more difficult as financial markets and 
securities instruments have become more complex. Structured finance 
securities such as mortgaged-backed securities and collateralized debt 
obligations are much more complicated in structure and valuation than 
simply the straight debt obligation of a company with an ordinary balance 
sheet, a history of financial performance, and projections of future 
performance.72 Complexity is the handmaiden of uncertainty. With greater 
complexity, the task of the rating agencies has become more difficult.73 
8. Implicit Collusion with Investors.—Lastly, a “dirty secret,”74 or 
what John Coffee has dubbed a “sinister danger,”75 is that investors also 
implicitly wanted overrated securities during the credit rating bubble. Many 
financial institutions are regulated as to the types of investments they can 
make and have capital requirements for particular portfolios of 
investments.76 Inflated credit ratings permitted regulated investors and 
 
69 See Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and the Business Education 
of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 363 (2009) (“In the past several decades, the financial markets have 
seen geometric growth in complexity.”). 
70 See Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 497 (2005) (tracing the rise of 
securitization to the 1970s). 
71 For example, simple financial ratios on profitability, liquidity, and solvency can be performed 
with information from audited financial statements. See RHEE, supra note 19, at 79–83. 
72 SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 10 (noting increased financial complexity as a factor in 
the increase in the demand for credit ratings). 
73 See id.; Hill, Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies, supra note 7, at 284. 
74 See Aaron Lucchetti, Kara Scannell & Craig Karmin, SEC Aims to Rein In the Role of Ratings, 
WALL ST. J., June 24, 2008, at C1 (“The dirty secret of some bond investors is that they simply bought 
securities with the highest yield for a given rating, which is why they snapped up complicated securities 
tied to subprime mortgages. Those securities often got high ratings but yielded more than other, more 
standard securities with the same rating.”). 
75 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 259 (“[T]here is the even more sinister danger that many institutions 
(in particular, money market funds) wanted inflated ratings so that they could earn the higher returns 
from riskier securities. To hold such higher yielding securities, it was necessary for them to be able to 
rely on the stability of the rating and the unlikelihood of a post-issuance rating downgrade.”); see also 
Jess Cornaggia & Kimberly J. Cornaggia, Does the Bond Market Want Informative Credit Ratings? 
(Feb. 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://business.nd.edu/uploadedFiles/Academic_
Centers/Study_of_Financial_Regulation/pdf_and_documents/Does_the_Bond_Market_Want_Informati
ve_Credit_Ratings.pdf (arguing that rating agencies were slow to downgrade ratings to serve 
institutional desires to hold risky securities). 
76 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
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portfolios to invest in risky securities that were expected to produce greater 
yields.77 In this sense, incorrectly rated securities were real options78 to 
evade the letter and spirit of the prudential regulation, and like all options 
they benefitted the holder to the extent the investor was not naïve. Thus, 
inflated ratings permit greater discretion in investment activities to pursue 
profitable yields. 
 
 * * * 
 
This litany of causal factors shows that the industrial organization of 
the credit rating industry is uniquely problematic. Rating agencies are not 
optimally organized to provide the highest quality credit ratings, and the 
problem has been difficult to solve. A major problem has been the 
inadequate link between compensation and proper incentive. The public 
policy implications are several. Since competition is not vigorous, there is 
less incentive to improve and innovate even as financial instruments and 
capital markets have become more complex, requiring ever more diligent 
and competent rating services. When the industry exists as a duopoly plus 
in which the regulatory and competitive barriers to market entry are high, 
and when the need for credit ratings is substantial, the effectiveness of a 
reputation market as a bond on performance is questionable at best. The 
lack of robust competition and proper bonding of performance will 
continue to undermine the quality of credit ratings even as they continue to 
play an important role in an increasingly complex capital market. 
C. Regulatory Responses 
In both the United States and Europe, rating agencies were not directly 
regulated until 2006.79 Instead, rating agencies were indirectly regulated by 
the SEC and regulators of financial institutions through the regulation of 
investments and capital structure.80 Although the NRSRO designation was 
important, the SEC never officially defined the status or the procedure to 
obtain it and was parsimonious in granting the designation.81 Since the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which required the SEC to conduct a study of the 
 
77 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 234 (“But in choosing between these options, a dirty little secret 
about credit ratings must be recognized; investors have biases of their own, and many want inflated and 
stable credit ratings that allow them to hold risky securities.”). 
78 A real option is an option that is embedded in a particular situation or choice and that can be 
analyzed and valued from the perspective of option-pricing theory. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra 
note 21, at 253–55. 
79 Coffee, supra note 7, at 246. 
80 Id. at 246–47. 
81 Id. 
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rating agencies but did not otherwise regulate them,82 Congress has enacted 
two statutes that substantially regulate rating agencies. 
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 created a regulatory 
framework for the provision of NRSRO status.83 The statute granted the 
SEC rulemaking powers with respect to the regulation of conflict of 
interest, disclosure, performance monitoring, and annual reporting 
requirements.84 However, it denied the SEC the power to “regulate the 
substance of credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which 
any nationally recognized statistical rating organization determines credit 
ratings.”85 In Congress’s view, the SEC lacked the required expertise to 
regulate credit rating and financial models.86 Pursuant to the statute’s grant 
of power, the SEC promulgated a number of rules governing the NRSRO 
application procedure,87 recordkeeping, disclosure, reporting of information 
and experience data,88 regulation of abusive practices and conflicts of 
interest,89 and competition among NRSROs.90 
The Dodd–Frank Act is the other major legislation.91 The statute 
enhanced the potential liability of rating agencies. Section 939G of the 
statute enhances accountability by exposing rating agencies to greater 
liability. It exposes rating agencies to potential liability under Section 11 of 
the Securities Act of 1933.92 Section 933 provides that the enforcement and 
penalty provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 shall apply to statements 
made by a rating agency to the same extent as registered public accounting 
 
82 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 797 (Section 702 requires the 
SEC to “conduct a study of the role and function of credit rating agencies in the operation of the 
securities market”); see SEC REPORT ON ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT AGENCIES, supra note 8. 
83 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327. 
84 Id. § 4, 120 Stat. at 1329–38 (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by inserting § 15E). 
85 Id. 120 Stat. at 1332 (inserting § 15E(c)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
86 Coffee, supra note 7, at 247. 
87 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-1 (2012). 
88 Id. §§ 240.17g-2, 240.17g-3, 240.17g-7. 
89 Id. §§ 240.17g-4, 240.17g-5, 240.17g-6. 
90 Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3). Rule 17g-5(a)(3) provides equal access to information and data disclosed 
to the rating agency by the issuer in a structured finance transaction to other NRSROs. 
91 See generally Aline Darbellay & Frank Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies Under the Dodd–Frank 
Act, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1 (2011) (providing overview of Dodd–Frank’s 
provisions on credit rating agencies). 
92 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k(a) (West 2009). Section 11 permits civil liability for false statements and 
omissions in a registration statement, subject to certain due diligence defenses of persons subject to 
liability. Id. § 77k(a)–(b). Previously, SEC Rule 436(g) provided that credit ratings were not considered 
a part of the registration statement “prepared or certified by a person within the meaning of sections 7 
and 11 of the [1933] Act.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1). The purpose of Rule 436(g) was to exclude rating 
agencies from civil liability under Section 11. Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration 
Statements, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,024, 42,024 (Aug. 18, 1981). However, Section 939G of Dodd–Frank 
provides that “Rule 436(g) . . . shall have no force or effect.” Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939G, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890 (2010). 
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firms and securities analysts.93 It imposes liability on rating agencies that 
knowingly or recklessly failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of the 
rated security or to obtain reasonable verification of factual elements.94 
In addition to enhanced liability, the Dodd–Frank Act provides the 
SEC more regulatory powers to enhance the quality of credit ratings. The 
statute creates an Office of Credit Rating tasked with supervisory and 
monitoring functions.95 The SEC has the power to revoke the NRSRO 
status for specific classes of securities.96 Rating agencies are subject to new 
regulations on maintenance of data and information on performance and 
controls, reporting of results and operations, internal governance, conflict 
of interest, and whistle-blowing protections.97 The Dodd–Frank Act also 
removes some statutory references to credit ratings98 and requires a study of 
the regulatory reliance of credit ratings.99 
A legislative arc is apparent in the Sarbanes–Oxley and the Dodd–
Frank acts. Sarbanes–Oxley mandated the SEC to conduct a broad study of 
the credit rating industry, including the role of credit rating agencies, the 
importance of that role, any impediments to accurate credit ratings, any 
barriers to market entry, and any conflicts of interest.100 Dodd–Frank is 
more targeted in mandating a study. The statute requires the GAO and the 
SEC separately to study how alternative compensation models can increase 
the accuracy of credit ratings.101 Congress has now focused on the 
relationship between compensation and incentives. 
The regulatory reforms of Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank have 
improved the credit rating industry. The improvements, however, have 
been incremental and have not changed the fundamental dynamics of the 
industry.102 The core aspects of the problem remain: a duopoly plus, issuer-
 
93 Dodd–Frank Act § 933, 124 Stat. at 1883–84. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. § 932(a)(8), 124 Stat. at 1877. 
96 Id. § 932(a)(3)(I), 124 Stat. at 1874. “The Commission may temporarily suspend or permanently 
revoke the registration of a nationally recognized statistical rating organization with respect to a 
particular class or subclass of securities, if the Commission finds, on the record after notice and 
opportunity for hearing, that the nationally recognized statistical rating organization does not have 
adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently produce credit ratings with integrity.” Id. 
97 Id. §§ 932, 934, 124 Stat. at 1872–84. The SEC has implemented some of these mandates, as 
seen in scattered provisions in Rules 17g-1 through 17g-7, but there are more rules to come. 
98 Id. § 939, 124 Stat. at 1885–87. 
99 Id. § 939A, 124 Stat. at 1887. 
100 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 702, 116 Stat. 745, 797. 
101 Dodd–Frank Act, §§ 939D, 939F. 
102 See Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank, supra note 7, at 142 (noting that the 2006 statute “did not 
prevent rating agencies from disastrously misrating subprime mortgage securities”); Manns, 
Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, supra note 7, at 749 (arguing that legal reforms “have fallen far 
short”). 
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pay model, industry custom of multiple ratings, and high natural barriers to 
market entry even as regulatory barriers have been somewhat lowered.103 
Although the new regulations have not fundamentally changed the 
industry or erected an entirely new regulatory edifice, they should not be 
underestimated. As I show infra Part III.B., the new regulations have laid 
the groundwork to implement an alternative compensation scheme of the 
sort proposed in this Article.104 
D. Review of Prior Proposals 
Over the years, there have been a number of proposals advanced to fix 
the problems of the credit rating industry. These proposals can be 
organized into three methodology-based categories of reform: reconfigure 
the industry structure that has created a duopoly plus and stifled 
competition, create disincentives and enhanced accountability through 
increased liability, and create positive incentives through alternative 
compensation schemes. A number of commentators have provided 
thoughtful critiques of these proposals,105 and this Article does not repeat 
that exercise here. For useful background information, I briefly summarize 
these proposals and critiques. 
1. Proposals to Reconfigure the Industrial Organization.—The 
boldest proposal is a nationalization of the credit rating industry or some 
substantial functions thereof. It has been proposed that the government can 
organically create its own ratings capability, or publicly fund rating 
agencies.106 Whichever way a public takeover is executed, the proposal of 
the government providing credit ratings is problematic. Nationalization 
would result in unprecedented intrusion into the pricing mechanism of the 
financial markets by the government,107 and would contradict a century-old 
market regulatory policy of abstaining from substantive assessments of 
 
103 “The problem is that there is no ready alternative. Moreover, the market norms of using ratings 
from rating agencies—indeed, particular rating agencies—will not disappear even if the statutory and 
regulatory references are removed [as mandated by the Dodd–Frank Act].” Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank, 
supra note 7, at 144. 
104 See infra Part III.C. 
105 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 251–71; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 592–608. 
106 See GAO 2012 REPORT, supra note 8, at 8–9 (summarizing a proposal for random selection of 
rating issuances by a ratings clearinghouse); Milosz Gudzowski, Mortgage Credit Ratings and the 
Financial Crisis: The Need for a State-Run Mortgage Security Credit Rating Agency, 2010 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 245 (proposing a government rating agency); Lupica, supra note 7, at 671 (proposing that 
the government oversee the rating process and impose penalties such as loss of NRSRO status and 
impose monetary fines for poor performance); Lynch, supra note 7, at 300–01 (proposing that rating 
agencies be publicly funded). 
107 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 260–61 (noting the dangers of a “public” rating agency and 
potential political problems).  
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investment opportunities.108 Rating government-issued bonds is a major 
part of the rating agencies’ business. As recently as spring 2011, S&P 
downgraded the United States from AAA to AA+, the first time that the 
creditworthiness of the U.S. government has been called into question.109 
What would a public or government rating agency do under these 
circumstances? The joint power of the government to regulate securities 
and investments, assign ratings, and affect valuations in the market may be 
too great of an intrusion into private investment decisions and runs the 
substantial risk of injecting political considerations into the workings of the 
capital markets.110 The potential for mischief, particularly for government 
issuers, government-sponsored entities, or favored industries, would be 
significant. The notion of a nationalized credit rating industry or substantial 
functions thereof is not a good idea, and it is hard to imagine how such a 
reform is politically feasible. 
Another suggestion is to promote a free market philosophy of spurring 
greater competition by creating more rating agencies in the industry.111 This 
idea sounds good in the vacuum of abstraction, but the idea of organically 
growing more rating agencies does not work absent the existence of a 
specific set of favorable conditions, which is the challenge. 
First, although the SEC has liberalized the granting of NRSRO 
licenses, the eight smaller rating agencies have a minute portion of the 
market share. Natural barriers to entry hinder the organic growth of rating 
agencies, and there may be nothing that can be done about this situation in 
the short to intermediate term. 
Second, a free market solution is a bad idea without concurrent reform 
of the issuer-pay compensation model. Without compensation reform, 
 
108 It is axiomatic that the predominant regulatory philosophy in securities regulation is disclosure 
of information and not assessment of the investment opportunity. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
230 (1988); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977). 
109 See United States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered to ‘AA+’ Due to Political Risks, 
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S (Aug. 5, 2011, 8:13 PM), 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=1245316529563. Moody’s has also 
signaled a potential downgrade. See Announcement: Moody’s Updates on Rating Implications of US 
Debt Limit, Long-Term Budget Negotiations, MOODY’S INV. SERV. (June 2, 2011), 
http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Updates-on-Rating-Implications-of-US-Debt-Limit-Long? 
docid=PR_220066 (“Whether the outlook on the [U.S. government’s credit] rating would be stable or 
negative would depend upon whether [there is] meaningful progress toward substantial and credible 
long-term deficit reduction.”). 
110 Coffee, supra note 7, at 260–61. “[M]ore importantly, serious doubt exists that a ‘public’ rating 
agency could give a negative (or ‘junk’) rating to an important or politically-favored local firm. 
Consider whether over the last decade a U.S. ‘public’ rating agency would have dared to rate the bonds 
of General Motors (G.M.) as ‘junk’ (or non-investment grade).” Id. at 260. 
111 See Grundfest & Hochenberg, supra note 7, at 5 (proposing that investors create their own 
rating agency that must provide a rating for every issue); Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, supra 
note 7, at 85 (proposing “gradually to increase the number of NRSROs and . . . for new firms to 
establish their reputations and perhaps carve out some niches”). 
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greater competition runs the real risk of a classic “race to the bottom” as 
many rating agencies compete for fees and engagements. This was the 
poisonous dynamic we saw in the Enron debacle among professional 
advisers and gatekeepers.112 A pure competition for engagements may have 
the unintended opposite effect. 
Third, a free market solution runs into constraints in the labor market. 
Credit analysts and rating agencies are not an infinite resource. Indeed, the 
Dodd–Frank Act implicitly recognizes the limited labor market and the 
potential that rating agencies may not have appropriately trained 
employees.113 Creating and sustaining a successful business enterprise is 
very difficult, especially in the Wall Street financial services industry. 
High-level financial services work requires significant investments in 
human capital and a critical mass of highly skilled financial professionals. 
The competitive labor market may not support the organic growth of new 
rating agencies of substantial size and scale.114 
Fourth, if competition by smaller rating agencies ever increases, a 
reasonably foreseeable response by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch would be to 
compete vigorously or to acquire the competitors.115 We would not expect 
these firms to simply stand by as other competitors eat into their market 
share. The M&A market, unless proscribed, will perpetuate market 
concentration. Thus, for all of these reasons the idea of a free market of 
competition is easier assumed than actualized.116 
2. Proposals to Reduce the Reliance on Credit Ratings.—Another 
suggestion to reconfigure the industrial organization is to substitute credit 
ratings with market metrics such as credit (yield) spreads and credit default 
swap (CDS) spreads, thus eliminating the problem by marginalizing the 
rating agencies.117 A credit (yield) spread is the difference in yields of 
 
112 See generally COFFEE, supra note 38, at 29 (explaining that Enron’s outside consulting firm 
acquiesced to their dubious accounting policies out of a fear that “the deep-pocketed client would shift 
its consulting business at the drop of a hat”); MALCOLM S. SALTER, INNOVATION CORRUPTED: THE 
ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF ENRON’S COLLAPSE 211 (2008) (quoting one of the first business journalists 
to challenge Enron’s strategy and results, who explained that Enron “was one of the highest fee-paying 
companies on Wall Street, so everybody wanted their business. And firms were willing to do whatever 
it took to get that business. The money came far ahead of the ethics.”). 
113 Section 936 provides that the SEC shall issue rules designed to ensure that credit analysts meet 
“standards of training, experience, and competence necessary to produce accurate ratings.” Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 936, 124 Stat. 1376, 1885 
(2010). 
114 See supra note 57. 
115 See supra note 67. 
116 See SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (“[B]ecause of the importance of reputation, the 
difficulty in establishing a reputation quickly, and other economic factors, it may take some time before 
the impact of increased competition can be observed.”). 
117 Flannery, Houston & Partnoy, supra note 7; Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, supra note 7, 
at 85–86; Partnoy, supra note 2, at 624. 
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bonds from specific risk-free benchmarks such as treasury instruments of 
the same duration.118 A CDS is essentially bond insurance in which the 
protection buyer will pay a premium (or spread) to an insurer to protect 
against default, and if a default occurs the insurer pays the difference 
between the face value of the debt and its market value.119 Credit and CDS 
spreads are measures of value and price. The basic argument is that credit 
(yield) spreads and CDS spreads incorporate into the price of bonds and 
bond insurance the likelihood of default, and that the market is better at 
quickly incorporating new information than rating agencies. The proposal 
to use market metrics as a substitute for credit ratings is not without 
criticism.120 
The argument to marginalize the use of credit ratings through a 
substitute ultimately depends on whether credit ratings provide some 
regulatory or informational utility. Some have argued that credit ratings are 
not useful.121 Some have questioned whether reliance on rating agencies can 
be justified by empirical data or theory.122 However, others have suggested 
that rating agencies are useful on two grounds. First, they correct a problem 
of asymmetric information in the credit market by acting as an independent 
information intermediary, thus correcting the “lemon” problem.123 Second, 
rating agencies reduce the net costs of regulation by relieving investors and 
regulators from the burdens of erecting a complex infrastructure to analyze 
bond investments.124 
 
118 BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 579. 
119 Id. at 580. 
120 See, e.g., LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 440 (concluding that this idea is “ill-
conceived” and “unsubstantiated”). 
121 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 10, 21–24 (2006) (arguing that rating agencies provide no useful informational value to the 
capital markets); Partnoy, supra note 2, at 624. 
122 See Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 581–85 (arguing that there is little theoretical or 
empirical support for the existence of rating agencies). 
123 See COFFEE, supra note 38, at 287–88; Arnoud W.A. Boot, Todd T. Milbourn & Anjolein 
Schmeits, Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 81 (2006); Listokin & 
Taibleson, supra note 7, at 95–97; see also George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Michael Rothschild & Joseph 
Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect 
Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976). The “lemon” problem occurs when there is information 
asymmetry on the quality of a good sold on the market between buyers and sellers, and a resulting 
mismatch on pricing of the item for sale. The basic thesis is that buyers, not knowing whether the good 
is a quality item or a “lemon,” will price the good offered for sale at a lower price than the seller of a 
quality item would sell, thus resulting in a market in which “lemons” are sold and quality items are 
withdrawn. Some commentators have argued that there is a potential “lemon” problem in the bond 
market because issuers and investors stand in a position of information asymmetry concerning credit 
quality. Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 7, at 95–97. Rating agencies are said to correct this problem 
because they act as a neutral third-party information intermediary. Id. 
124 COFFEE, supra note 38, at 288. 
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In addition to these two justifications, I also suggest that rating 
agencies serve a useful information-sorting function. Start with the 
proposition that the credit market is much larger than the equity market,125 
and that investors must analyze this enormous market. Rating agencies 
organize information on issues and issuers with a broad taxonomical brush, 
which is their rating system. Like any form of organization, this systematic 
categorization is useful, though it may be rough or imperfect. Each investor 
can then apply its limited resources to make finer investment analyses. By 
maintaining an organization of the credit universe, rating agencies create a 
common information platform resulting in greater efficiency in the analysis 
of creditworthiness. In more concrete terms, the three major rating agencies 
deploy almost four thousand bond analysts,126 and the entire credit market 
is sorted under a common organization. Despite the current problems of the 
credit rating industry, the system of credit ratings has a market rationale. 
Clearly, if rating agencies provide useful service as a matter of empirical 
fact or theory, then, flaws notwithstanding, the argument to substitute away 
(eliminate) credit ratings would be diminished considerably in light of the 
fact that the substitute would represent a new, untested regulatory scheme 
as an alternative to an existing useful scheme. 
The theoretical case that rating agencies are useless is far from clear. 
The argument is belied by the empirical facts that rating agencies do exist, 
have shareholders who invest in them to the tune of tens of billions of 
dollars, and are relied upon by investors in the market. The critics have not 
explained why the market or the government continues to massively 
misallocate resources if indeed the business of credit ratings is a useless 
enterprise. One would think that the collective delusion on the usefulness 
of credit rating would have been finally shattered by the experience in the 
financial crisis, and yet it is far from clear that all constituents have come to 
this conclusion. 
Another basic problem is that while the creditworthiness of a bond is 
highly relevant to the value of bonds and bond insurance, market valuations 
and creditworthiness are different concepts and cannot be conflated as 
one.127 The market value of a bond depends on both exogenous and 
endogenous factors.128 Default risk is clearly an important factor in value. 
However, valuations are subject to market-influenced factors such as the 
 
125 See infra Part I.A (showing the size of the bond market); infra note 208 and accompanying text 
(showing the number of outstanding issues covered by rating agencies). 
126 See SEC SEPT. 2011 REPORT, supra note 7, at 8 (showing that ten NRSROs employed 3990 
credit analysts, and that the three largest rating agencies employed 3598 credit analysts). 
127 “Credit ratings grade credit risk. . . . [R]atings don’t value the instrument. They couldn’t, 
because default risk is only one factor of security risk. The other factor that drives the market value of 
the obligation is market risk . . . .” LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 82–83. 
128 Id. at 67. 
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prevailing interest rate environment and transitory market conditions.129 
Historically, yield spreads have narrowed and contracted, in the same way 
that stock markets have meandered in a random walk through peaks, 
valleys, and plateaus of the financial markets,130 whereas the “intended 
cycle-neutrality of ratings is one of the contributors to the stability of 
ratings.”131 These are some of the complications that need to be sorted 
through when we envision a scheme in which a yield spread in the range of 
x% to y% is said to be correlated to a specific ordinal grade of 
creditworthiness, particularly when these yield spreads will change in 
absolute values and in relative terms. We do not know in what way CDS 
spreads or yield spreads, which are continuously subject to market 
dynamics, should translate into the equivalent of credit ratings for the 
purpose of regulating investment portfolios and financial institutions. These 
same concerns also apply to the substitution of CDS spreads for credit 
ratings since CDS spreads are also a measure of price and value.132 
Market volatility and unpredictability, which affect credit spreads, 
may produce regulatory uncertainty and instability to the extent credit 
ratings affect the regulation of investments across a wide sector of investors 
and financial institutions. Because markets are never static, there would be 
a continuous need to monitor markets and assignments of credit ratings; 
this means that there must be a large, analytic infrastructure in place, 
funded by someone, to do these things. If rating agencies are displaced, 
there must be some governmental body or private vendor that continuously 
monitors financial data for hundreds of thousands of bond issues 
outstanding and applies a set of uniform standards in matching CDS 
spreads or yield spreads at any given moment to analyze the investment 
portfolios of regulated investors. Even if credit ratings are replaced with 
market metrics, someone must monitor the portfolios of regulated investors 
based on market metrics, and this must be done continuously since markets 
 
129 Id. at 71. “Hence, ratings and spreads suitably adjust in a reasonably consistent way after some 
time, yet significant variability in the relationship remains.” Id. at 72. 
130 BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 579 fig. 23.2 (showing historical data for yield 
spreads of Aaa, Baa, and high-yield bonds as compared to 10-year Treasuries); see LANGOHR & 
LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 65 (showing data on fluctuating credit spreads over time and commenting 
that “[t]hese spreads are neither constant over time nor identical for all bonds”). For example, in an easy 
credit environment or a credit bubble of the kind that led to the housing bubble and the financial crisis, 
we would expect to see yield spreads contract, and in a tight credit market we would see widening of 
credit spreads. See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 579 fig. 23.2 (see the period from 
2003 to 2008 and the dramatic widening of the credit spreads). 
131 LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 80. 
132 For example, during the financial crisis, the CDS spreads of Boeing, General Electric, Disney, 
and Dow Chemicals, which all traded within a narrow band of within 100 basis points, became 
increasingly volatile, trading in a range of approximately 700 to 100 basis points. This was a 
remarkable display of volatility for blue chip companies, even though only one of them, General 
Electric through its division GE Capital, can arguably be said to be at its core a financial services firm. 
See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 580 fig. 23.3. 
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are dynamic. Thus, rating agencies would be replaced with another set of 
monitors. 
3. Proposals to Enhance Liability.—In the fields of criminal law and 
torts, liability can be used to incentivize proper behavior.133 Traditionally, 
rating agencies have been successful in defending against liability.134 
Rating agencies have a judicially recognized First Amendment defense on 
the basis that they are merely providing an opinion on a public matter.135 
Absent actual malice, bad faith, or similar malfeasance, they can credibly 
argue that they should be protected from onerous potential liability 
whenever an issuer defaults and ex post fault is found in the agency’s rating 
process or exercise of judgment.136 Recently, however, liability risk has 
increased. The Dodd–Frank Act exposed rating agencies to Section 11 
liability for material misstatements in the registration statement.137 Also, a 
federal district court has permitted fraud claims to proceed to trial against 
rating agencies for misleading ratings for structured finance bonds issued in 
the time period of the financial crisis.138 
 
133 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW (1987); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968). 
134 See Bai, supra note 7, at 286–90 (describing key cases). 
135 See Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2007); In 
re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 817–26 (S.D. Tex. 2005); 
Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc., 988 F. Supp. 1341, 1347 (D. 
Colo. 1997), aff’d, 175 F.3d 848, 858 (10th Cir. 1999). 
136 See Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 690 F.3d 98, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that 
investors failed to present a claim for negligent misrepresentation and demonstrate privity of contract 
with the rating agencies); Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor’s Fin. Servs. LLC, 
700 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 2012) (dismissing complaint for negligent misrepresentation); First Equity 
Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that rating agency 
is not liable for incorrect information); In re Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 387 F. Supp. 902, 905 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that rating agency has no duty to verify statistical information relied upon to 
provide rating). 
137 Dodd–Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939G, 124 Stat. 
1375, 1890 (2010). Previously, rating agencies were exempted under SEC Rule 436(g). Rating agencies 
can still shield themselves from liability because Section 11 requires the naming and consent of the 
expert. Section 11 requires that the expert “with his consent [has] been named as having prepared or 
certified any part of the registration statement,” and that the “written consent” of named experts be filed 
with the registration statement. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(4), 77g(a) (2006); see In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-
Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167, 183 n.11 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that despite the repeal of Rule 436(g), 
rating agencies must still satisfy the naming and consent requirements of Section 11). In light of this, 
Moody’s and other rating agencies have announced that they will not consent to the disclosure of their 
ratings in the registration statements of new issues. See 2011 Moody’s Corporation Form 10-K, supra 
note 53, at 18. 
138 See King Cnty., Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 288, 305–12 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that credit ratings were subject to an actionable theory of misrepresentation); 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(denying in part summary judgment motions by Moody’s and S&P on fraud claims of some plaintiff 
investors); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 
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Liability for malfeasance, such as fraud and bad faith, as a policy 
matter is a given. But liability based on negligence or error cannot be a 
significant part of fundamental reform. There is a structural issue. 
Compensation cannot be the theory of liability based on fault.139 Typical 
deals in the bond market can be enormous, sometimes into the billions of 
dollars.140 As of 2010, the bond market was capitalized at $108 trillion.141 
The parent companies of Moody’s and S&P have combined market 
capitalizations of about $14 billion and $15 billion, respectively.142 This is a 
maximum value exposure-to-market capitalization ratio of 4500-to-1. Of 
course, this ratio is not “value at risk” in the sense of the formal financial 
measure;143 the probability of the entire bond market being devalued to zero 
would be nil. But even if the ratio overstates the matter quite a bit, it gives 
a sense of proportion. The larger point is that “a single case could produce 
a billion dollar (or greater) judgment,”144 thus crippling these firms that 
serve a vital market function.145 Unlike most areas covered by accident law, 
there is no liability insurance, and hedging the credit risk is impossible due 
to simple economics: the revenue generated from rating is far less than the 
CDS spread (in other words, the cost of insurance is greater than the 
revenue generated from the activity insured against).146 
If deterrence is the only plausible theory of liability, there is not yet a 
coherent theory to impose liability on the credit rating industry. Liability 
for bad faith and intentional malfeasance is an easy, undisputed issue. 
When fraud is involved, rating agencies should not be able to hide behind 
the First Amendment or contractual doctrines. But the much harder 
 
2009) (rejecting a First Amendment defense for ratings of structured financed securities). It is worth 
noting that these three trial court cases have all been handled by District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin. 
139 Coffee, supra note 7, at 252–53. 
140 For example, Apple Inc. recently made a $17 billion bond issue. Katy Burne & Mike Cherney, 
Apple’s Record Plunge into Debt Pool, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2013, at C1. 
141 See supra note 20. 
142 McGraw Hill Financial, Inc. (MHFI), YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=MHFI&ql=0 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2013); Moody’s Corp. (MCO), YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=
MCO&ql=1 (last visited Nov. 21, 2013). 
143 “Value at risk” or VaR is defined as “the maximum loss that can be incurred with a given 
probability.” SERGIO M. FOCARDI & FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE MATHEMATICS OF FINANCIAL MODELING 
AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 748 (2004). 
144 Coffee, supra note 7, at 252. 
145 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to 
Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1700–01 (2006) (noting that 
after Arthur Andersen, the federal government has been reluctant to prosecute other accounting firms 
for fear of destroying the limited number of large accounting firms, as the Enron prosecution did for 
Arthur Andersen). 
146 The typical fee for a corporate bond issue is in the range of 4–5 basis points. LANGOHR & 
LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 413. On the other hand, CDS spreads are far in excess of this level even for 
blue chip companies. See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 580 fig. 23.3 (showing CDS 
premium rates). 
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question is whether there is common space between a theory of deterrence 
and liability based on negligence, incompetence, or laziness (i.e., the worst 
types of conduct that would still be excusable under the business judgment 
rule in corporate law147), such as demonstrable errors of judgment and 
analysis or lack of effort based on some objective standard. From a cost–
benefit framework for analyzing accidents,148 the point at which the 
marginal benefit of better credit ratings equals the marginal cost of 
precautions is not immediately clear. One could reasonably guess that this 
calculation weighs in favor of additional marginal investment in 
precautions because the cost of the harm (potentially billions of dollars in 
bond values at stake) is so great. But this could mean that the theory of 
deterrence may result in liability up to the point of diminishing the rating 
agencies as viable investments by shareholders. The implication could 
mean that rating agencies should be pure public goods without a profit 
motive, but this cannot be the answer unless one is willing to accept the 
extreme view that rating agencies should be nationalized. The threat of 
monetary sanctions must be calibrated to affect incentives, proper 
performance, and financial viability of these important firms. One suspects 
that in a high-volume, multi-trillion dollar industry with billions of dollars 
in fees earned annually, getting a theoretically correct calibrated level of 
sanctions right would be a difficult endeavor for regulators and courts. A 
properly calibrated legal standard may not be consistent with the operation 
of private firms in this area. 
4. Proposals to Impose Alternative Compensation Models.—Several 
other proposals seek to impose the proper incentives on rating agencies 
 
147 See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(“[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively 
wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational,’ provides no 
ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either 
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, 
Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“If, however, corporate directors were to be found liable for 
a corporate loss from a risky project on the ground that the investment was too risky (foolishly risky! 
stupidly risky! egregiously risky!—you supply the adverb), their liability would be joint and several for 
the whole loss . . . .”); WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 231 (4th ed. 2012) (“[D]isinterested directors who act deliberately and in 
good faith should never be liable for a resulting loss, no matter how stupid their decisions may seem ex 
post.”); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the 
Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1672 (2001) (suggesting that directors will not 
be held liable for “pretty dumb” decisions); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and 
Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 
676 (2002) (“[I]t shields directors who follow the requisite procedures from liability even when they 
make reckless, foolish, and downright stupid decisions.”). See generally Robert J. Rhee, The Tort 
Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139 (2013) (arguing 
that tort principles have a role to play in corporation law). 
148 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 133, at 55–60; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ACCIDENT LAW 19–21 (1987). 
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through change in compensation as the key to reform.149 One proposal is to 
empower the government to make the engagement decisions for issuers.150 
This was embodied in the Franken Amendment to the Dodd–Frank Act, 
which was never passed. It would have required a government agent to 
choose the rating agency for structured finance issues, though the issuer 
would remain free to select a second rating agency.151 The Franken 
Amendment was watered down in the Dodd–Frank Act to a provision 
requiring the SEC to study the feasibility of a scheme,152 but Congress gave 
the SEC the power to adopt such a scheme if the latter deemed it necessary 
and appropriate.153 This proposal would minimize the inherent conflict of 
interest because issuers no longer have the power to “shop” for ratings. 
However, it poses a new problem. It is unclear how a government agent 
would select the engagement—randomly, sequentially, or through some 
assessment of quality, perhaps. On a deeper level, since the assignment of 
engagements would determine market share, how would the market share 
of each firm be determined? Market share could become ossified if 
assignments were made based on current market share. Alternatively, the 
government agent, upon determining the relative quality of firms, could 
alter market share in favor of one firm over the other. Neither option is 
palatable for obvious reasons. 
Another proposal is to switch to an investor-pay model.154 An investor-
pay model comes in different varieties, such as a mandatory subscription-
based model or a user-fee model.155 Proposals in this vein are problematic 
for a number of reasons. An investor-pay model would simply reverse the 
polarity of the current structural bias in favor of the issuer toward a bias in 
favor of bondholders or subscribers.156 Instead of overrated bonds, we may 
have underrated bonds. Furthermore, as noted above, some commentators 
have even suggested that bondholders actually wanted overrated bonds.157 
 
149 See Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 7, at 94; Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 
supra note 7, at 794. 
150 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 256 (describing the model). A variant of this proposal is to assign 
engagements randomly or by rotation. These variations confront the same problems. Also, “the problem 
with such a system is that it creates little incentive for rating agencies to compete based on the quality 
of their ratings.” Id. at 258. 
151 See id. at 257–58 (describing the amendment); Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank, supra note 7, at 
146–47 (same). 
152 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 939F(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1375, 1889 (2010). 
153 Id. § 939F(d). 
154 See, e.g., Grundfest & Hochenberg, supra note 7 (proposing an investor-owned rating agency); 
Manns, Rating Risk, supra note 7 (proposing a user-fee model). 
155 See GAO 2012 REPORT, supra note 8, at 9–14 (providing summary of alternative compensation 
models). 
156 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 255 (“Investors also have biases that can create conflicts for rating 
agencies . . . .”). 
157 See supra Part I.B. 
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There is a question of whether the incentive created by an investor-pay 
model would produce the most accurate ratings. 
A deeper problem is that a user-fee or subscription-based model may 
not be economically feasible for rating agencies.158 Rating agencies cannot 
capture the full economic value of their product because once credit ratings 
are disclosed to some paying investors, there will always be free riders,159 
or the costs of rating services may be reduced by agreements to share 
ratings among users or subscribers. These business problems prompted 
rating agencies to change their business models to an issuer-pay model.160 
Commentators have argued that rating agencies “probably could not persist 
at their current scale of operations without the issuer-pays model, and may 
not survive its loss.”161 A fundamental change in the compensation model 
mandates a dramatic change in the business models of large, publicly held 
rating agencies that have existed for a long time, which is no small matter. 
In perhaps the most creative proposal on the compensation front, some 
commentators have proposed that rating agencies be paid with the debt they 
rate.162 An economic stake tied to performance would incentivize rating 
agencies to provide higher quality ratings. While debt compensation might 
reduce the incentive to overrate the issue, an economic stake in the issue 
may incentivize rating agencies to underrate the issue. This proposal 
correctly frames the larger perspective: the link between compensation and 
incentive, and at the same time the infeasibility of moving away from the 
issuer-pay model as a matter of practicality and politics of regulation. 
However, the proposal is infeasible. It does not work if rating agencies 
could sell the debt and the right to receive the debt immediately.163 If they 
are subject to a lockup, this obligation would create significant business 
and financial problems.164 Depriving rating agencies of cash revenue may 
significantly disrupt operations.165 Rating agencies are not in the business of 
 
158 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 255; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 571–72. 
159 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 255; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 582; see also LANGOHR 
& LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 412. 
160 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 255 & n.66; Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 571–72; 
Gudzowski, supra note 106, at 254–55. Due to financial difficulties, the rating agencies changed their 
business model to the issuer-pay compensation model during the 1940–1960 time period. Fitzpatrick & 
Sagers, supra note 7, at 571–72. 
161 Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 571. Fitzpatrick and Sagers further note that the decline of 
equity security research by investment banks evinces the infeasibility of subscription-based 
compensation models of securities research operations. Id. at 571–72 & n.46; see also Coffee, supra 
note 7, at 259 (“Securities analysts have similarly found investors resistant to paying for investment 
advice.”). 
162 See Listokin & Taibleson, supra note 7, at 94. 
163 Coffee, supra note 7, at 254. 
164 See id. at 253–54 (noting liquidity problems). 
165 For example, in 2012 Moody’s incurred operating expenses of $1.65 billion, most of which 
were paid in cash. MOODY’S CORP., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 65 (2012), available at 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/MOOD/2476041436x0x643051/E0E15B0E-744C-44CD-B56B-
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holding a portfolio of bonds.166 Even if they were required to hold a 
portfolio of debt, much of the envisioned incentive could be undermined 
through hedging strategies on the portfolio of bonds held by the rating 
agencies, unless these investment activities were concomitantly prohibited. 
 
 * * * 
 
The above overview demonstrates that the problem of credit rating 
agencies has been difficult to fix. Many of the proposals are sweeping in 
scope and call for dramatic reconfiguration of the industry or regulatory 
scheme. Others simply would not work. As such, these previous proposals 
raise serious questions of feasibility and practicability. The problem of 
credit rating agency incentive has not been fixed. 
II. PROPOSAL FOR A COMPENSATION COMPETITION 
A. Properly Conceptualizing Competition and Incentive 
In addressing the problems of the credit rating industry, the goal of 
regulation should not be to radically restructure a preexisting, multi-billion 
dollar industry. Instead, with minimal intrusion, the law should create the 
necessary conditions to stimulate robust competition where currently the 
market does not work well due to cozy cooperative relationships among 
nominal competitors. In this respect, proper incentive is the condition 
precedent to robust, positive competition. 
The basic problem is not the lack of strong competition per se. 
Competition can be good or bad. Many competitors working under an 
issuer-pay model would run the risk of devolving into a race to the bottom 
to gain business from issuers.167 In parsimoniously granting NRSRO status, 
the SEC may have been right to be concerned about negative competition 
among fledgling firms without strong history, resources, or reputation 
capital.168 Strong competition is good only if it incentivizes a race to excel. 
Competition is not the end, but is the means. 
 
CF72F02CD9B7/MCO_2012_Annual_Report_vFINAL.pdf. The balance sheet shows that Moody’s 
had only $555 million of accounts payable. Id. at 67. 
166 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 254 n.64 (noting that the proposal could convert rating agencies 
into “inadvertent” investment companies subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940). 
167 Compare Coffee, supra note 7, at 247 (noting that the SEC was parsimonious in granting 
NRSRO status because “it feared that new and ‘fly-by-night’ rating agencies would be more generous 
in awarding investment grade ratings and thereby lead a race to the bottom”), with D. Daniel Sokol & 
James A. Fishkin, Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 
45, 68–69 (2011) (suggesting that the evidence is mixed on whether industry concentration in banking 
tends to stabilize or destabilize the financial markets). 
168 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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Any reform measure must solve the incentive problem. Reputation 
capital notwithstanding, there is not a strong incentive to improve the 
quality of credit ratings when the market is concentrated among a few 
competitors whose business interests are well protected by regulatory 
licenses, natural barriers to entry, and the benefits of market share—a cozy, 
profitable arrangement for rating agencies. 
Poor quality credit ratings are not the inevitable outcome of a 
concentrated industry. Positive, robust competition can be achieved if the 
incentives are properly structured. Consider a simple analogy in sports. 
Competition can be fierce either when there are many competitors, e.g., a 
golf championship or a marathon, or when there are just two competitors, 
e.g., a chess or tennis match. In the latter, competition is fierce because it is 
structured as a winner-take-all, zero-sum game. The problem in the credit 
rating industry is that all three major firms consistently and concurrently 
win since the engagement of one is not done to the exclusion of the others 
and usually involves an engagement of the others as well.169 From a game 
theory perspective, the firms stand more in a cooperative posture with each 
other than in a competitive one because they are essentially partner 
monopolists.170 
The game must change from a win–win to a win–lose outcome—or at 
least a portion of the game must be so. 
B. Mandating Pay-for-Performance 
A pay-for-performance mechanism in compensation would foster 
vigorous competition among Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. This claim assumes 
that firms do not like to lose when forced to compete, the outcome of which 
is directly connected to profits. This assumption is empirically sound. 
The problem in the credit rating industry is similar to the problem of 
corporate governance, where some scholars have argued that executive pay 
is not as strongly linked to performance as it could be. The idea of pay-for-
performance has broad support, at least in the academy, in the field of 
executive compensation.171 Prominent scholars have argued that the 
disjunction between pay and performance has led to inefficiency and real 
 
169 I do not advocate the elimination of the double-engagement industry practice for three reasons: 
(1) double engagements provide additional information to the market, (2) a rule of single engagement 
does not diminish the concern of structural bias in the issuer-pay model, and (3) the number of 
engagements seems to be an appropriate private choice and there are insufficient reasons for 
government intrusion into the choice of an issuer seeking a second opinion. See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, 
supra note 1, at 63 (“As long as each one provides its own judgment about it—independent and in 
different ways from its competitors—the combined information to the market in the split ratings should 
be valuable extra information to investors.”). 
170 See SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (describing Moody’s and S&P as a “partner-
monopoly”); Hill, Limits of Dodd–Frank, supra note 7, at 138. 
171 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
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costs for corporations.172 In the credit rating industry, a pay-for-
performance scheme does not naturally arise due to the unique aspects of 
the credit rating industry: a duopoly plus industrial organization, issuer-pay 
compensation model, and industry practice of using multiple rating 
agencies in a single issue.173 Each factor undermines competitiveness with 
easy profits and regulatory rents; collectively they suppress the incentive to 
excel. Accordingly, the condition for competition through pay-for-
performance incentives must be created through regulatory mandate. 
My proposal assumes that the industrial structure and practices remain 
the same. It does not depend on a radical move away from the issuer-pay 
model. The amount of fees, payment forms, and other transactional 
considerations remain private matters. However, rating agencies should be 
made to bond their performance. This can be accomplished without a 
heavy-handed regulatory intrusion. Only a marginal adjustment to the 
issuer-pay model is needed. The pay-for-performance scheme entails the 
creation of a mandatory performance bonus. It is a hybrid public–private 
compensation scheme. For the portion of the revenue not ceded, the 
compensation scheme would be determined by private actors, but the ceded 
revenue would constitute a publicly administered compensation plan. 
To start, I limit participation to Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch (I later show 
how participation can be expanded to promote and incubate other rating 
agencies174). The three rating agencies would submit a small portion of their 
revenue to fund a bonus pool of deferred compensation, an incentive bonus. 
For illustrative purposes, let’s assume a bonus pool based on a small 5% of 
accrued revenue.175 At regular intervals,176 the performance of each agency 
would be statistically evaluated by an independent agency based upon 
regulatory disclosure requirements that for the most part are already in 
place.177 If insufficient, these requirements can be supplemented with 
additional SEC rules, but the regulatory oversight of the rating agencies 
would be limited to independent confirmation of performance.178 Upon 
evaluation, the best performer is identified and the incentive bonus would 
be awarded on a winner-take-all basis. 
This scheme has a technical problem that must first be solved. As 
suggested, the contribution must be based on a fixed percentage of revenue, 
 
172 See id. 
173 See supra Part I.B. 
174 See infra Part II.D. 
175 See infra Part II.C (providing data and analysis showing how 5% is feasible). 
176 The data must be sufficient to make a reasonable determination of statistical performance. Thus, 
a multiyear period is probably needed. 
177 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2 (2012) (providing for the maintenance of data and information on 
credit ratings and experience); id. § 240.17g-3 (providing for annual financial reports to SEC). 
178 This scheme would be in addition to other forms of regulation already in place, including 
liability under the securities laws. See supra Part I.C. 
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and not on a common flat contribution of $X. Each firm is different in size 
and earns different revenue amounts in any given year.179 A fixed 
contribution does not work because the amount has relative value to each 
firm, and thus incentives and financial effects are not symmetric. This is 
less of a problem between Moody’s and S&P, which are comparable in 
scale, but Fitch is a much smaller firm.180 Since Fitch is a significant player, 
it must be a part of the scheme. The contribution must be a fixed 
percentage of revenue, which would result in different contribution 
amounts by each firm. This rule creates its own technical problem: how do 
we equitably and symmetrically allocate the bonus in light of the different 
contributions made? 
The scheme should permit different levels of contribution in a three-
way game, but always maintain a 1-to-1 payout ratio. There is a simple 
solution to the problem. The condition is met only when there are two 
concurrently played subgames within the larger competition. The “main 
game” would involve a three-way competition with the bonus amount 
calculated as three times the contribution of the smallest player. The “side 
game” would involve a two-way competition with the bonus amount 
calculated as the contribution in excess of the main-game allocation. Since 
the side game would be between the two larger players only, the ceded 
revenue is capped at the revenue contribution of the second-largest player. 
In a multiplayer game, these rules maintain a 1-to-1 payout ratio as to all 
players, thus maintaining fairness and symmetry of economic stakes.181 
An example illustrates how the proposed rules work. Assume that 5% 
of revenue for S, M, and F are 120, 100, and 50. Since S is the largest 
player, it can only contribute 100, which is the contribution of the second-
 
179 See infra Table 4 and note 184. 
180 In 2012, Moody’s earned revenue of $1958 million, and S&P earned revenue of $2034 million. 
2012 Moody’s Corporation Form 10-K, supra note 53, at 38; The McGraw-Hill Cos., Annual Report 
for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2012 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-1023, at 28 [hereinafter 2012 
McGraw-Hill Form 10-K]. In 2011, Fitch earned revenue of €525.7 million, which at a $1.30-to-€1.00 
exchange rate is $683 million. FIMALAC, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 102 (2012). (At the time of this 
writing, Fimalac’s 2012 annual report was unavailable.) 
181 This scheme is similar to the payout rules in no-limit poker. See DAVID SKLANSKY, THE 
THEORY OF POKER 3–4 (4th ed. 2007). In no limit poker, a player can bet any amount she has at the 
table, but if the opponent has a smaller sum at the table, the “action” (play) between the two is only for 
the smaller sum wagered between the two players. Id. The player with the greater funds can make 
additional bets with other players who can match her bets. For example, suppose players A, B, and C 
have, respectively, 100, 80, and 60 at the table. Player A cannot “chase away” B and C from a hand just 
because she has greater funds at the table to wager. If A bets “all in” with 100, B and C can “call” the 
bet, but they can only bet the table stakes of 80 and 60. The main pot is for 180, which is the 
contribution of 60 from each player. The amount of 20 is returned to A since B can only match A’s bet 
up to 80. A side pot of 40 is created for the winner between A and B (C does not participate because he 
lacks the funds). If C has the best hand among the three, C wins 180, which is a 1-to-1 payout of the 
amount he bet. If B has the second best hand, B wins the side pot of 40. Player A is the big loser with a 
net loss of 80. Player B bet 60 and gained 40 for a net loss of 20. Player C bet 60 and gained 180 for a 
net gain of 120. 
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largest player, M. The smallest player, F, contributes 50. The total bonus 
pool is 250. The allocation is based on the following rules: the winner in 
the main game among S, M, and F gets 150; the winner in the side game 
between S and M gets 100. If S or M wins outright against all competitors, 
it would win the main and side games and thus collect 250. If F wins the 
main game, it would get 150, but since F did not contribute to the side 
game it is precluded from this game. There would still be a side game 
between S and M, who have staked additional funds, for the 100. 
We can apply these simple allocation rules to a compensation 
competition among Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. Suppose firms S, M, and F 
earn these revenues: S(s), M(m), and F(f) where s > m > f. Since S earns 
the most revenue of the three players, it needs to contribute only m, the 
contribution of the second-largest player. In each competition period, the 
payoffs and losses can be generalized as follows: 
TABLE 1: MODEL OF PAYOUTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There would always be a three-way “main game” in which Moody’s, 
S&P, and Fitch compete for these stakes: (1) if Fitch wins, three times 
Fitch’s contribution; or (2) if Moody’s or S&P wins, the entire bonus pool. 
If Fitch wins the main game, there would always be a “side game” between 
Moody’s and S&P for the contributions they made into the bonus pool in 
excess of Fitch’s bonus. 
The side game can yield a net win or a net loss, depending on the size 
of Fitch’s contribution relative to those of Moody’s and S&P. Under 
current financial performance measures, winning the side game would 
result in a net gain because Fitch’s contribution would be much smaller. 
However, if the three competitors are similar sizes, winning the side game 
may result in a net loss. 
For example, assume that the ceded revenues are S = 100, M = 100,  
F = 40 (thus, the total bonus pool is 240), and that F wins the main game 
and S wins the side game. The results would be: 
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TABLE 2: EXAMPLE OF POSITIVE PAYOUT FROM SIDE GAME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the side-game allocation between S and M is large enough to 
offset the loss of ceded revenue, S is a net winner even though it lost the 
main game. 
Now, assume that the ceded revenues are S = 100, M = 100, F = 80 
(thus, the total bonus pool is 280), and again F wins the main game and S 
wins the side game. The results would be: 
TABLE 3: EXAMPLE OF NEGATIVE PAYOUT FROM SIDE GAME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, even after winning the side game, S is a net loser because F has 
won most of the bonus pool by winning the main game. 
Thus, the side game is meaningful to the two losers of the main 
game, and the winner can either net a gain or mitigate a loss, depending on 
the smaller competitor’s contribution of ceded revenue. 
Under the above rules, all three rating agencies will always have 
“skin in the game.” The game is perfect from the perspective of symmetric 
incentives and equities among players of disparate wealth contributions. 
Importantly, the competition is zero sum and the “awards” are self-funded. 
C. Financial and Economic Analyses 
The creation of a bonus pool raises two questions: (1) What is the 
financial effect of the proposal? (2) What is the economic theory of the 
incentive? The financial analysis goes to the issue of economic and 
business feasibility, which in turn is relevant to legal feasibility as well. 
The economic analysis goes to the issue of efficiency. I will address these 
issues in turn. 
1. Financial Effects of the Proposal.—In the above discussion, I use 
an illustrative bonus amount of 5%. Based on public information found in 
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the annual reports of Moody’s Corporation and McGraw Hill (S&P’s 
parent company), we can get a sense of the monetary stakes involved. In 
the following table, I provide simple data on financial and valuation 
metrics for each firm.182 
TABLE 4: FINANCIAL DATA ON MOODY’S AND S&P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm value is defined as market capitalization plus long-term debt.183 
Operating income is claimed by equity and debt capital providers. 
Accordingly, the multiple of firm value to operating income provides a 
metric of valuation based on how much equity and debt are valued based 
 
182 See 2012 McGraw-Hill Form 10-K, supra note 180, at 28, 49, 51; 2012 Moody’s Corporation 
Form 10-K, supra note 53, at 38, 65, 67; FIMALAC, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 180, at 102. At 
the time of this writing (and as of July 6, 2013), Fimalac’s 2012 annual report was unavailable, and thus 
2011 figures are used. Moody’s is a part of Moody’s Corporation, a publicly traded company (NYSE: 
MCO). S&P is a part of McGraw Hill Financial, Inc., a publicly traded corporation (NYSE: MHFI). 
Fitch is 50% owned by Fimalac, S.A., a publicly traded French company (Euronext Paris: FIM), and 
50% owned by Hearst Corp. On March 22, 2013, McGraw Hill Companies sold its educational 
publishing business, and reorganized as McGraw Hill Financial. Market capitalization figures were 
from yahoo.com/finance as of the specific date, and for McGraw Hill the market capitalization is the 
pre-restructuring figure. The revenue and operating profit figures are the segmentation results of the 
credit rating business units, which are found in the Form 10-Ks, and not the consolidated results of the 
parent companies. Fitch is not included in these calculations because Moody’s and S&P each are more 
than twice as big as Fitch. A comparison of Moody’s and S&P, the two duopolists, suffices to illustrate 
the point. One observation needs to be noted. The United States’ civil action against McGraw Hill, filed 
on February 4, 2013, significantly depressed the stock prices of both McGraw Hill and Moody’s. On 
February 1, Moody’s and McGraw Hill closed at $55.35 and $58.34. YAHOO! FIN., 
http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2013) (providing historic stock prices). On February 5, 
Moody’s and McGraw Hill closed at $45.09 and $44.92. These declines in share price lower the 
valuation multiples. 
183 I used firm value to operating income as the valuation metric rather than price to earnings 
because McGraw Hill was undergoing a restructuring to create McGraw Hill Financial (see supra note 
182) that made its net income figures unreliable. See 2012 McGraw-Hill Form 10-K, supra note 180, at 
5–7 (describing the restructuring process); The McGraw-Hill Cos., Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 
Ended Dec. 31, 2011 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-1023, at 9 [hereinafter 2011 McGraw-Hill Form 10-K] 
(same). 
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on each dollar of operating income. This multiple, an average of 11.8x 
operating income, is used to determine how much equity value is deducted 
or gained from losing or winning the compensation game. 
Based on the above data and method, Moody’s and McGraw Hill 
would each cede approximately $98 million in revenue in any given year 
(5% of Moody’s 2012 revenue, which is only slightly less than S&P’s 
revenue). If either Moody’s or S&P wins, the revenue gained would be 
$196 million from their ceded revenues plus Fitch’s contribution of $34 
million.184 Assume that operating expenses would be unaffected by a 5% 
revenue charge because the same amount of operating expenses would be 
needed to generate 100% of the revenue irrespective of subsequent ceding 
of revenue.185 This means that for Moody’s and S&P the total annual stake 
in the compensation game would be $230 million in potential augmentation 
to operate income, or $132 million net of the ceded revenue. These 
incentives alone constitute a large pot of money—and significant incentive 
to win the competition on a recurring basis. 
Based on these simple assumptions, if either Moody’s or S&P were 
to continually lose the competition to the other such that it would incur a 
perpetual loss of 5% ceded revenue, and if the valuation multiples remain 
static, the implied loss of equity value would be approximately $1156 
million (= $98 million × 11.8). On the other hand, if a firm earns the 
performance bonus on a perpetual basis by continually beating the other 
and the multiples remain static, it would add to its equity value 
approximately $1557 million (= $132 million × 11.8). The theoretical range 
of potential value change would be a spread of about $2.7 billion.186 
This $2.7 billion spread range is only a theoretical outer limit 
because we do not expect perpetual losses for either firm. In a robust 
competition, no firm will always win or lose. The actual range of potential 
valuation effects will be much tighter (perhaps a negligible sum for the 
reasons explained below). Nevertheless, in any competition period there 
would be substantial economic stake in winning the rating competition. For 
a firm that consistently wins the competition, the market will eventually 
factor in a performance expectation that will result in a valuation premium 
relative to the other two firms. 
Since a ceding of revenue deducts from the top line, and winning 
creates variance in profitability, a question is whether there are valuation 
 
184 FIMALAC, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 180, at 102. Fitch earned revenue of €525.7 
million, and its 5% contribution is calculated as: €525.7 × 5% × $1.30/€1.00 = $34.2 million. Id. 
185 I relax this assumption in the economic analysis that follows because changing incentives may 
change resource allocation decisions in the firms, which may affect profit and loss. 
186 In all likelihood, if a firm continues to lose the competition, valuation would adjust in a way 
that discounts the expected return of the ceded revenue and the multiple would contract as the market 
would see the firm as inferior to the winner, which would likely receive a multiple premium. Thus, the 
theoretical range would be greater than $2.7 billion, which assumes static valuations. 
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implications of imposing this potential financial cost on firms. The 
valuation calculation must consider the incremental variability of earnings 
and cash flow resulting from the competition. Increased variance would 
negatively affect the firm’s cost of capital such that we may see a potential 
valuation contraction for both firms. If so, the competition may not 
necessarily be a zero-sum game. Moody’s and McGraw Hill may suffer a 
combined decrease in market value. The loss net market value of the 
combined firms would result in a social cost on one side of the ledger, 
which must be considered as a cost of regulation. 
However, it is unlikely that we would see a net loss in value for two 
reasons. First, the 5% is always ceded, which means that the mandatory 
contribution reduces revenue but does not add variance to a firm’s financial 
results. The ceded revenue is a fixed obligation like overhead. Since 
variance results when a firm wins the bonus, it is skewed toward positive 
outcomes. Second, exposure to risk from the competition can be reduced to 
zero through perfect hedging. A shareholder needs to buy one share each in 
the three firms of the duopoly plus to fully invest in the credit rating sector. 
This investment strategy perfectly diversifies the unique risk of each firm 
with respect to the bonus. In other words, a diversified investor would 
assume no greater volatility of earnings or cash flow due to the zero-sum 
nature of the compensation game.187 Thus, there is no significant loss of 
value from the proposal. 
The next question is whether the 5% figure is feasible as a business 
proposition. The answer is clearly “yes.” A review of the financial 
performances of Moody’s and S&P shows that there is substantial room to 
impose a mandatory contribution. Below are the 2012 revenue, operating 
profit, and operating margin of Moody’s, S&P, Goldman Sachs, Accenture, 
Lazard, and FTI Consulting.188 These firms operate in different industry 
sectors, but they provide significant professional advisory services. 
Goldman Sachs is a leading investment bank, and Accenture, Lazard, and 
FTI are leading advisory businesses. The following table provides financial 
data on these companies as compared to Moody’s and S&P.189 
 
187 If Fitch is introduced into consideration, an investor can easily invest in the three firms as a unit, 
thus reducing variance of cash flow to zero. 
188 More detailed information about these companies is available on their company websites and 
Form 10-Ks. I selected Accenture, Lazard, and FTI because these firms represent a wide range of 
consulting practices. Accenture is a large firm with a strategic-management and technology focus. 
Lazard is an investment bank, but its primary business is M&A advisory services. FTI provides a wide 
array of services including economic and litigation consulting. The FTI operating profit was adjusted to 
add back $110.3 million of a goodwill impairment charge recognized in 2012. FTI Consulting, Inc., 
Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2012 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-14875, at 79 
[hereinafter 2012 FTI Form 10-K]. 
189 2012 FTI Form 10-K, supra note 188, at 79; The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Annual Report for 
the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2012 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-14965, at 117; Accenture plc, Annual 
Report for the Fiscal Year Ended Aug. 31, 2012 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-34448, at F-4; LAZARD, 
2012 ANNUAL REPORT 77 (2013). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
122 
TABLE 5: COMPARISON OF FINANCIAL DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moody’s and S&P have high operating profit margins compared to 
the above leading firms. Keep in mind that they are different businesses, 
but the different levels of financial performance are stark. A ceding rate of 
5% would have significant impact on any business (of course), but the 
important takeaway is that on the whole the rating agencies would not be 
financially threatened in any way. Indeed, if the operating profits of 
advisory services are the benchmark (7%–13%), the rating agencies could 
cede as much as 25% of revenue and still be within the range of financial 
feasibility. Thus, there is a small impact on margins and financial 
operations, but as the above analysis also shows, the rating agencies would 
have substantial economic incentive to win the game because 5% ceded 
revenue is still a lot of money at stake. 
2. Economic Theory of the Proposal.—We see that there is wide 
financial room to mandate participation. This raises the question of whether 
there is a theory of the optimal level of ceded revenue. The first principle is 
business feasibility. We should not impose an amount that risks financial 
distress. This is not a great concern because rating agencies enjoy such 
healthy profits. That Fitch is significantly smaller in terms of revenue and 
profits does not present a problem because the equities can be made to be 
symmetric with equal-allocation rules. 
The more serious question concerns the relationship between private 
profits and public gains. Due to the lack of competition, rating agencies 
have not exerted the sufficient effort or insufficiently invested in the 
business to provide the best credit ratings, or both.190 Clearly, since they do 
 
190 See supra notes 41, 49 and accompanying text (providing accounts of lack of diligence); see 
also Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: What 
Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd–Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243, 
1303 (2011) (“What is particularly shocking is the lack of due diligence done by the rating agencies in 
connection with issuing AAA ratings, from which they collected hefty fees.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 514 n.157 (2012) (“[R]ating agencies have not 
historically engaged in due diligence, focusing solely on risk assessment from information provided.”). 
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not stand to lose business, these investment decisions have been profitable; 
but equally clearly, they have resulted in public harms. Thus, we should 
explore the relationship among the cost of effort and investment, social 
benefit of better credit ratings, and the incentive to make the investment 
based on short-term consideration of winning the bonus and the long-term 
financial and reputational consideration of losing consistently to other 
competitors. Applying a standard cost–benefit analysis, we can set the 
bonus such that the marginal benefit of better quality outcomes equals the 
increased investment of effort and capital, capped at the point of significant 
increase in the risk of financial distress. This is a simple principle, but 
achieving it may be more difficult. 
This calculus is a bit more complicated because the cost–benefit 
analysis from a social welfare perspective is dependent on the private 
incentives of rating agencies in determining whether to make the 
investment necessary to win. The variables of this private cost–benefit 
analysis that drive each firm’s behavior are: (1) the probability distribution 
of winning based on incremental efforts made, (2) the expected value of 
investment and return, (3) game theoretic considerations on opposing 
firms’ efforts to win and their iterative effects on one’s expected value, and 
(4) costs of “opting out” of the game by taking the 95% of revenue and 
conceding any effort to win by not investing in any effort at all. From a 
game perspective, the competition can be played competitively or perhaps 
cooperatively in which players agree to make the minimal investments to 
maintain the status quo. For reasons explained infra Part III.A., I do not 
think that the interactions will lead to collusive behavior. The rating 
agencies would not collusively agree to “opt out” because this arrangement 
would be highly unstable. Where the equilibrium lies in these calculations 
when all of these factors are considered is difficult to predict. 
The above sets forth the economic theory of the incentive amount. In 
practice, policymakers must make a qualitative judgment based on findings 
of facts on the level of investments already made, the amount of 
investments that can be made, and the potential benefits in higher quality 
ratings. Intuitively and without more data of the kind that would be relied 
upon by policymakers, the optimal point is in the range of feasibility based 
on 2012 financial measures of 5% to 25%. It seems that within this range, 
greater investments would yield greater marginal returns on investments as 
measured by quality of ratings. If the rating agencies choose to compete 
through increased investments in credit ratings, profits may decline. 
Reduced profitability may be a private loss, but not a social cost if the 
return on more accurate credit ratings exceeds the cost of additional 
investment in human capital.191 The difference between the current rating 
 
191 Rating agencies might have strategically chosen not to compete against investment banks for 
human capital, and as a result the necessary investments were not made toward achieving “state of the 
art” quality in credit ratings. See Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, supra note 7, at 81. 
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agency profit levels and lower profits in the investment banking and 
advisory industries may represent the regulatory rents rating agencies earn 
from the current state of the industrial organization.192 
D. Toward a Robust Secondary Market 
The above proposal applies only to the duopoly plus. In this section, I 
suggest that the same structure can be used to promote a robust secondary 
market for credit ratings among newer, less-established rating agencies. 
The core idea here is that competition can be enhanced by creating an 
information market on credit ratings in which other rating agencies can 
make financial bets against the bonus pool. 
The market would work like this. Any smaller or newer NRSRO 
interested in issuing a rating would be given the same information as a 
rating agency that has been engaged by the issuer to provide a rating. Some 
regulatory precursors are already in place. Rule 17g-5 mandates an equal 
access obligation for ratings of structured finance securities.193 If an issuer 
provides a rating agency information for a structured finance instrument, it 
must make the same information available to other NRSROs to enable 
them to issue their own ratings. This rule was intended to foster 
competition among NRSROs.194 The Dodd–Frank Act eliminates the 
exemption rating agencies enjoyed from Regulation FD,195 which requires 
that when an issuer discloses material, nonpublic information to certain 
individuals or entities (generally, securities market professionals, such as 
stock analysts) the issuer must also make public disclosure of that 
information.196 Thus, some of the key regulations to achieve information 
access and parity have already been implemented. 
With the necessary information, any rating agency can provide an 
unsolicited credit rating. Frequently, newer and smaller rating agencies are 
compelled to provide unsolicited credit ratings to break into the market and 
establish a reputation.197 Consistent with current market practice, the issuer 
would not otherwise be forced to pay for the rating from a rating agency it 
has not engaged, and the rating agency would incur its own costs in 
 
192 This may explain why famed investor Warren Buffett made a substantial investment in 
Moody’s. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 6, at 207 (“Buffett said that he invested 
in the company because the rating agency business was ‘a natural duopoly,’ which gave it ‘incredible’ 
pricing power—and ‘the single-most important decision in evaluating a business is pricing power.’”). 
193 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5 (2012). 
194 Coffee, supra note 7, at 248. “Of the 318,056 outstanding credit ratings for asset-backed 
securities” at the time of measurement, “all but 17,604 [were] issued by” firms other than the duopoly 
plus. SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 7. 
195 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939B, 
124 Stat. 1375, 1887–88 (2010). 
196 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100. The exemption for rating agencies is found in 17 C.F.R. 
§ 243.100(b)(2)(iii). 
197 See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 410, 423–26. 
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providing the rating. However, the rating would become a part of a 
portfolio of ratings that would be evaluated against the ratings provided by 
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. If the rating agency outperforms these big three 
agencies that are mandated to participate in the bonus pool, it would be 
paid back its expenses plus profit based on a reasonable rate of return from 
the bonus pool.198 The remainder of the bonus pool would go to the winner 
of the main competition among the duopoly plus. This bonus would 
constitute a subsidy to newer and smaller competitors that have taken risks 
and proven their worth. 
This incubation program has several functions. First, it permits 
smaller competitors to compete in the information market even without 
engagements from issuers and their investment bankers. They are not 
economically frozen out, but they are also not undeserving beneficiaries of 
a subsidy, either. The competition is not a free ride to the smaller 
competitors since they are providing free rating services with only the hope 
of recovering expenses and profit upon outperforming larger, more 
established competitors. Second, smaller rating agencies confront high 
natural barriers to market entry. They may be uncompetitive in the labor 
market for finance professionals. New rating agencies also face a Catch-22 
situation in which they must have a reputation for competence, adequacy of 
resources, longevity, and experience to get engagements.199 Thus far, the 
SEC has not been able to resolve these problems. A program of shadow 
competition provides opportunities for smaller rating agencies to gain 
experience and a history of success, thus building the essential reputation 
capital that is needed to obtain regular engagements from issuers. Third, a 
more robust information market on credit ratings is superior to a state of 
less information. This is why issuers seek double ratings. It is logical that 
the credit market would benefit from multiple assessments of a particular 
issue’s creditworthiness issued by rating agencies with an incentive to 
provide the most accurate rating. 
An incubation program is a pathway for smaller rating agencies to 
learn, grow, and compete. Eventually they may graduate to the “big 
leagues” and earn a seat at the main compensation game. Even though 
reputation and client lists take time to develop, there is precedent for such a 
move. Fitch was once a smaller firm, but it has gained significant market 
share through a specialization in international and structured finance 
issues.200 Also, A.M. Best is a small firm, but has a very good reputation in 
 
198 The setting of rate of return or a reasonable profit is seen in other contexts. For example, the 
rates of profit for public utilities are regulated. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mo. Gas Energy v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 186 S.W.3d 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). 
199 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 234 (“Quite simply, the ‘Catch-22’ for new entrants is that it is 
nearly impossible to obtain clients unless one has a track record for reliable ratings, yet such a track 
record is difficult to generate unless one first has clients.”). 
200 See LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 398–402 (describing the growth of Fitch). 
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the special niche of insurance businesses. Smaller firms can grow to be 
significant competitors, but they require incubation, business opportunities 
with economic rewards, and a track record of success. 
This secondary market would enhance competition by enlarging the 
pool of competitors.201 It would diminish the importance of the size and 
financial strength of the three largest rating agencies because the smaller 
rating agencies need not be engaged by issuers to compete against the big 
rating agencies and they could compete at the level possible for their 
financial condition. Here again, all players would be playing for stakes 
fixed as a function of their individual financial conditions, thus giving each 
player a chance to earn its proportional payout in the game. A secondary 
market would create a situation in which the largest rating agencies could 
lose a portion of their combined revenue to an outside rating agency. 
III. POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Coordination and Collusion 
In light of the duopoly plus industry structure, one concern may be 
whether rating agencies would implicitly coordinate or collude.202 When 
forced to compete for economic gain, the three rating agencies may be 
tempted to take a “one for you, one for me” collusive approach to the bonus 
payment. Forced competition requires greater effort and quite probably 
greater investments that reduce profit. In a zero-sum game, the desire to 
maintain the status quo and signal détente would be great. This is not a 
serious concern. 
At the firm level, tacit coordination may appear possible due to the 
limited number of competitors, but as a practical matter such a feat would 
be difficult to execute. The situation here is not akin to price fixing in 
which only a few decisions by a few actors would be needed to coordinate 
with other firms. In a rating agency, such centralized decisionmaking does 
not exist. Each rating agency has over a thousand credit analysts and 
supervisors,203 and each rating requires a credit committee of various 
compositions of analysts, all of whom (analysts and committees) would 
presumably be exercising independent judgments on many thousands of 
bond issues and monitoring of outstanding issues. In the business of credit 
ratings, coordinating collusion cannot occur absent an explicitly illegal, 
broadly disseminated (thus easily discoverable) edict from the executive 
suite or the boardroom. 
 
201 See id. at 424 (suggesting that unsolicited ratings “provide a check against ratings shopping”). 
202 See generally ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION: 
CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS (2012) (providing economic analyses of anticompetitive behavior). 
203 SEC SEPT. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 8; SEC JAN. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 8. 
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Even if there is an illicit conspiracy to undermine the competition 
from the top, the execution at the bottom would be very difficult. Such top-
down coordination cannot work when there are thousands of decision 
points in each firm that must then be coordinated with those of several 
other firms. Coordinating performance and statistical outcomes, many of 
which are subject to uncertainty and market forces, would be practically 
infeasible even with tacit coordination. The complexity of coordination 
increases with each player added to the competition. 
A misstep in any coordinated action would quickly unravel a 
coalition. Assume a coordinated “one for you, one for me” agreement to 
maintain the status quo. Each firm may be tempted to cheat in light of the 
large financial payoff in any given year from the performance bonus, or 
each agent within the firm may have reasons to not abide by the firm 
objective, such as employee performance bonuses and career merits. A 
collusive, tacit agreement among three players would be highly unstable, 
and would likely devolve into active competition once the pattern of “one 
for you, one for me” is broken due to cheating, miscalculation, or some 
exogenous factor leading to unintended or unexpected outcomes. When 
rating agencies are forced to compete on merit, the possibility of collusion 
with so many moving parts is unlikely. 
B. Standard for Performance Assessments 
In the field of executive compensation, a pay-for-performance 
compensation scheme requires the promulgation of a standard to measure 
performance. This is easier said than done. Among other issues, there are 
questions as to the metric to be measured, the method for measurement, 
and the timing of measurement and compensation. The complexity of the 
problem is high. A similar but more difficult problem confronts the 
proposal here: how does an agency determine “the winner” of pay for 
performance? This problem of performance measurement is more difficult 
than in the context of executive compensation because there are, quite 
literally, thousands of data points on performance. I do not offer or 
advocate a specific assessment protocol. The purpose of this Article is to 
present the conceptual framework for reform. Experts in statistics and data 
analysis would be required to recommend and implement a technical 
protocol. However, the problem of performance measurement is not 
insurmountable. I offer the following thoughts on implementation. 
First, the assessment criteria must be based on accuracy and not on 
downward deviations of issues from ratings. The focus should not be on 
how many issues were overrated since it would impose a bias toward 
underrated securities resulting in significant detriment to issuers and a 
systemic increase in the cost of debt. The magnitude of the error should 
count but not directionality. Timeliness is also an important consideration. 
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It does the investor no good for a rating agency to downgrade the debt of 
company on the eve of bankruptcy, as was the case in Enron.204 Thus, 
directional correctness and timeliness are the two most important factors in 
formulating the assessment criteria. 
Second, the evaluating criteria must be broadly based, covering 
performance along all asset classes including difficult-to-rate structured 
finance instruments. This requirement would not open up the possibility of 
gaming by the rating agencies through calculated changes in the business 
mix, such as not entering the structured finance market on account of the 
difficulty of rating issues. The mathematics of profitability do not lead to 
rating agencies manipulating their business mix to game the overall 
performance review since the ceded revenue is a small portion of the fees 
earned. In other words, it would be unlikely that a rating agency would give 
up 95% of a highly profitable business line to enhance its chances of 
winning the 5% bonus pool, particularly since complex instruments such as 
structured finance bonds generate significantly higher profit margins.205 
Third, an assessment of performance should hinge substantially on 
statistical data on performance. Competent experts would be required to 
propose a statistical method to measure the quality of performance. There 
are many such experts in the academy and the financial profession. The 
SEC could also solicit the three largest rating agencies as well as various 
constituents of the capital market, including bond investors, to provide 
proposed rules and comments on the issue of assessment. The most 
difficult part of assessment is formulating the standard based on the criteria 
of correctness and timeliness. There is no doubt that various constituents 
may differ in opinions, including the rating agencies themselves, but like 
most things requiring expert opinion and judgment I have confidence that a 
rational, defensible standard can be set. That standard could be as simple as 
providing a universal standard based on the probability of default assigned 
to each rating, and an assessment could be made based on deviations from 
the “correct” standard as weighted by the number of issues and time. 
Reporting of credit ratings and defaults can be automated and much of the 
data analysis can then be performed with the use of technology and 
algorithms. Indeed, I anticipate that the data analysis part of the process 
would be far easier than formulating and achieving a consensus on the 
precise algorithm for assessment. 
Fourth, although the assessment should be primarily based on 
quantitative measures of performance, the SEC could add additional 
qualitative factors toward a weighted scorecard of best performance. Such 
factors can include compliance with rules and regulations, independent 
 
204 “Indeed, the principal recent criticism of credit-rating agencies has been that they have been 
reactive, rather than proactive, belatedly responding to negative information that has been publicly 
released, but seldom anticipating any serious decline.” COFFEE, supra note 38, at 285. 
205 See supra note 24. 
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assessments of governance, management of conflict of interest, and quality 
of internal controls, all of which were issues addressed in both the Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and the Dodd–Frank Act and 
implemented in SEC rules. The SEC or some other body can engage in 
determination of these qualitative factors. For example only, it might be 
reasonable for the final assessment to be based on 80% quantitative 
performance assessment and 20% compliance-based judgment. One need 
not fret too much over what the proper weight should be. It would be an 
exercise in asking why a set in tennis is based on winning six games and 
not four or eight.206 Why is any given sport or game scored the way it is? 
The point is that the standard should define the meaning of excellent 
performance, and the rating agencies must meet the standard. A part of that 
standard should be judged on compliance. 
Fifth, the critical question for implementation is this: can data 
analysis reveal “the winner”? Yes, because there is an enormous volume of 
statistical data.207 The following is data on outstanding credit ratings 
reported by NRSROs to the SEC in 2011208: 
  
 
206 There may be a historic reason why a tennis set is based on six games, but the general point still 
holds true. Indeed, tennis rules for determining the winner vary in significant ways. For sets, the rules 
for any tournament can provide that a player must win a set by at least two games, or she must win a 
tiebreaker based on the first person to reach a specified number of points. For matches, the rules can 
provide that a match is based on three or five sets. Regardless of which rules are in play, players and 
spectators generally accept the rules as determining the best player on that day, and more importantly 
one presumes that players compete equally vigorously irrespective of the specific criteria for judging 
the winner. 
207 See generally LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1. Indeed, the rating agencies approved by the 
SEC are called “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations.” Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932(a)(3)(I), 124 Stat. 1375, 1874 (2010) 
(emphasis added). 
208 SEC SEPT. 2011 REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. 
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TABLE 6: DATA ON OUTSTANDING RATINGS AS OF 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since there are so many outstanding, maturing, and defaulting issues at 
any given time, there is an enormous volume of data from which we can 
cull reasonable inferences on performance. Furthermore, the task of 
statistical analysis is made much easier by the fact that the industry custom 
is a multiple-rating system. It would be a much harder task, though by no 
means impossible, to determine which rating agency performed better if 
each rated mutually exclusive sets of securities. However, there is great 
overlap among the top three agencies. For instance, from 1976 to 2006, 
62,496 new domestic issuances of nonconvertible debt were credit rated, 
and of these 98.2% were multiple rated: 67.3% by two rating agencies, and 
30.8% by all three agencies.209 Consider another example: in a 
representative sample of 2514 corporate bonds outstanding at the end of 
March 1997, Moody’s had ratings on 92.5% and S&P 90.7%.210 The three 
rating agencies substantially overlap in work performed such that side-by-
side comparisons of performance outcomes are possible. Since there are so 
many outstanding, maturing, and defaulting issues at any given time, there 
would be no problem of gathering a dataset of ratings based on issues 
expiring and defaulting within defined periods of time from which periodic 
quality assessments could be performed. 
Sixth, the compensation competition is a repeat game, occurring at 
regular intervals. This interval need not be yearly, and in fact a multiyear 
interval of, for example, 3–5 years seems reasonable. The competition 
could be based on only the bond or debt issues expiring or defaulting 
during that period. These issues would be examined against the 
performance of the issue, initial rating assigned, and changes in rating. 
Each rating agency would be evaluated on the performance of the entire 
portfolio of expired and defaulting issues against the objective performance 
standards set for each credit rating, which is now required under the Dodd–
Frank Act.211 
 
209 LANGOHR & LANGOHR, supra note 1, at 54. 
210 Id. 
211 § 938, 124 Stat. at 1885; see infra Part III.C. 
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Lastly, perhaps the most serious criticism of the proposal is what 
may be called the perfectionist’s challenge—the argument that any 
statistical analysis, however sophisticated, would not be capable of 
determining the “true winner.” There would be too many technical 
difficulties, such as problems of data sampling, fluidity of credit ratings 
over time, different portfolios of covered bond issues, and numerous other 
factors that make identifying the best performer imperfect at best. To this 
criticism, a fair response might be, “le mieux est l’ennemi du bien.”212 
Epistemological certainty is not needed to implement the policy 
objective. The standard for assessment should be reasonably fitted to the 
objective so that, like any performance bonus, the risk of arbitrariness is 
mitigated. But errors, defined as deviations from the epistemological truth, 
do not undermine the policy goal. If there is objective application of a 
rational standard, we expect that any “errors” would average out for each 
player. Since the compensation game is a classic repeat-play game, the 
mathematical expectation from an imperfect standard would be zero. In the 
long run, the risk of error is diversified away. 
Errors are simply a part of the real world, including the legal process. 
One accepts that any standard of evaluation may be imperfect and thus 
subject to criticism. Many types of evaluative processes are far less 
quantitatively driven than the proposal here and subject to the discretion of 
individual judgment: just to name a few, the typical performance 
evaluations of employees including those of CEOs, tenure reviews of 
academics, strategic considerations in business planning, medical 
evaluations, and judgments in figure skating competitions. Virtually the 
entire panorama of human endeavors and observations is subject to 
imperfect evaluations and subjective probability assessments. Consider the 
core aspect of the legal process in civil actions—the preponderance of the 
evidence standard of proof.213 Based on this standard, we recognize that the 
legal process produces many “errors” from the perspective of some 
 
212 “Dit que le mieux est l’ennemi du bien.” (“The best is the enemy of the good.”) M. DE 
VOLTAIRE, LA BÉGUEULE, CONTE MORAL A3 (Geneva 1772). The aphorism attributed to this quote is 
that we should not let the lack of perfection get in the way of implementing something that is a net 
good. A related concept is the “nirvana fallacy,” which embodies the idea that we should not compare a 
superior, implausible solution to an inferior, plausible solution. See Harold Demsetz, Information and 
Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (“The view that now pervades much public 
policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing 
‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative 
institution approach in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional 
arrangements.”). 
213 See Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into the Selection of 
Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 638, 642 (2006) (noting that 
“objective probability of legal case assessment is impossible” and that “[l]egal actions cannot be 
described in the narrow, symmetric manner that is required for measurement”). 
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ontological truth.214 We seek reasonable outcomes based on objective 
application of a rational standard of evaluation. 
“Who is the winner?” is the penultimate question. It serves the 
ultimate inquiry: “Are the players incentivized?” From this perspective, a 
perfect assessment standard is not needed to serve this policy end. If a 
rational standard is applied objectively, the rating agencies subject to a 
performance evaluation will be incentivized to produce accurate credit 
ratings for the purpose of winning the competition. That there is some 
uncertainty in the process would produce more incentive to win by a 
clearer margin; thus, any potential for “errors” may actually benefit the 
end. On this point, economic analysis of incentives in the field of torts has 
significant application. Scholars have shown that uncertainty in litigation 
outcomes can lead to overcompliance.215 The basic argument is that if 
uncertainty is distributed normally around the optimal standard of care, and 
if the uncertainty is not too great, the legal rule will have an overdeterrence 
effect.216 Similarly, if there is some uncertainty surrounding the 
determination of the winner, the rating agencies may be incentivized to 
work harder to clear the margin of victory. Thus, the policy objective is 
served when the standard of evaluation is sufficiently connected to the 
criterion of accuracy, though perfect accuracy is not needed. 
C. Regulatory Foundation Laid by Dodd–Frank 
The proposal requires that a regulator collect the ceded revenue, 
assess performance, and award the bonus. Regulation must create an 
agency body to oversee the program, and must mandate rating agencies to 
collect and maintain data on performance. In this respect, the regulatory 
foundation necessary to implement the proposal has already been laid, 
which makes the implementation of the proposal easier and more feasible. 
The Dodd–Frank Act mandates the regulatory framework necessary 
to collect, maintain, and report data on performance. The rating agencies 
must provide ratings based on a common system of ratings, including the 
designation of alphanumeric ratings and the criteria applicable to each 
rating. The rating agencies already use very similar rating symbols.217 
 
214 See Robert J. Rhee, The Application of Finance Theory to Increased Risk Harms in Toxic Tort 
Litigation, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 155 (2004) (“But it does not shake the foundation of our legal 
system to say that errors, defined as deviations from the omniscient truth, occur frequently by the very 
nature of the adversarial system.”). 
215 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal 
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and 
Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986). 
216 Craswell & Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, supra note 215, at 299; see 
Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 
449–64 (2004) (arguing that uncertainty of sanction may lead to greater deterrence). 
217 See supra note 27. 
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Section 938 of the Dodd–Frank Act, titled “Universal Ratings Symbols,” 
requires the SEC to implement rules and procedures that: 
(1) [A]ssess the probability that an issuer of a security or money market 
instrument will default, fail to make timely payments, or otherwise not 
make payments to investors in accordance with the terms of the security 
or money market instrument; 
(2) clearly define and disclose the meaning of any symbol used by the 
[NRSRO] to denote a credit rating; and 
(3) apply any symbol described in paragraph (2) in a manner that is 
consistent for all types of securities and money market instrument for 
which the symbol is used.218 
There will be a universal standard against which the performance of 
rating agencies can be judged and assessed. The statute also imposes a 
regulatory reporting and disclosure structure, which has been partially 
implemented through SEC rules.219 If additional rules are required to 
produce a set of statistical disclosures, this can be done through the auspice 
of the Dodd–Frank Act’s mandate. 
With respect to an independent body or board that would evaluate 
performance and award the incentive bonus, the Dodd–Frank Act created a 
structure that could fill this role. Section 932 creates an Office of Credit 
Ratings within the SEC.220 Its charge is “to promote accuracy in credit 
ratings issued by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations; 
and . . . to ensure that such ratings are not unduly influenced by conflicts of 
interest.”221 The statute mandates that the staff should have knowledge and 
expertise in debt instruments, and that the Office of Credit Ratings should 
conduct annual examinations of NRSROs.222 If additional expertise or input 
is needed, the Office of Credit Ratings could be composed of regulators, 
academics, and disinterested industry professionals who would be tasked 
with analyzing performance and making recommendations as to the award 
of bonus, and could incorporate additional methods such as an industry 
survey of investors and other knowledgeable constituents. 
Commentators are correct to note that neither the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act of 2006 nor the Dodd–Frank Act has transformed the 
regulation of the credit rating industry or fixed the problem in some 
 
218 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 938, 
124 Stat. 1375, 1885 (2010). 
219 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17g-2, 240.17g-3 (2012). 
220 § 932, 124 Stat. at 1872, 1877 (amending Section 15E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
now codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)). 
221 Id. at 1877. 
222 Id. Matters to be examined are whether the rating agencies conduct business in accordance with 
the established policies and methodologies, manage conflicts of interest, implement ethics policies, 
exercise internal supervisory controls, have appropriate corporate governance, and monitor the activities 
of credit analysts. Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
134 
fundamental way.223 However, it may be too early to write off these statutes 
as failed exercises in correcting a difficult problem. The Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act of 2006 at least reduces regulatory barriers to entry. 
And, the Dodd–Frank Act in particular has enabled at least some of the 
process-based rules necessary to administer a pay-for-performance 
compensation scheme. In this respect, the two statutes, while not fixing the 
problem directly, have enacted the regulatory precursors to fundamental 
reform based on greater positive competition and correctly aligned 
incentives to perform. 
D. Political Reality of Regulation 
The economic and administrative feasibility of the proposal here are 
well within the realm of practical possibility. More than the potential for 
collusion or difficulties of performance metric, the political reality of 
effective regulation is the chief impediment to reform of the credit rating 
industry. In any regulation affecting corporate and Wall Street interests, 
there is always the reality of political feasibility.224 Although no one denies 
that better quality credit ratings are clearly a public good, there would be 
significant political opposition to effective regulation. The idea of 
regulatory capture has long been recognized.225 
Obviously the three rating agencies would oppose any attempt to put 
any contingencies on accrued revenue, however small. They would want to 
keep their rents. The proposal here means that the leading rating agencies 
would have to work harder and incur more costs and investments in human 
capital to improve the quality of their products and services—the value of 
this cost representing a component of the regulatory rent they earn from the 
current industrial organization. The political voices of Moody’s, S&P, and 
Fitch would be significant. 
Other powerful voices would speak against mandated competition. 
Investment banks and corporate issuers, which yield greater political clout 
than the three rating agencies, would be opposed as well. Several factors 
are at work. First, and obviously, issuers like overrated bond issues because 
they lower their costs of borrowing. From an issuer’s perspective, a lenient 
rating agency is better for business than an objective one. Second, the oft-
cited conflict of interest ultimately arises from the implicit threat that 
 
223 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
224 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd–Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to 
Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL. L. REV. 1019 (2012) (arguing that politics 
have become a major factor in financial regulation); Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in 
Financial Regulation, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 327 (2013) (same); see also Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt 
Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399 (2012) (arguing that politics play a 
major role in states’ financial distress). 
225 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 
(1971) (“A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is 
designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”). 
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issuers and their investment bankers might channel rating business to more 
lenient rating agencies (in reality, investment bankers are the ones who 
would wield this sword since they manage the issues). This is a real source 
of power, and it is rational to believe that investment banks would have a 
business interest in maintaining the status quo of this leverage. Third, 
higher rated bonds are arguably easier to manage in the issuance process, 
again making the jobs of investment bankers easier. It is plausible to think 
that the greater the credit risk, the greater will be the market scrutiny of the 
issue in the underwriting and sales process. Fourth, systemically higher 
credit ratings can increase the overall demand for bonds because they relax 
the regulatory restrictions on bond investments. Investment banks and 
corporate issuers benefit from this greater demand. 
Lastly, as mentioned above, the “dirty little secret” of the problem of 
credit ratings is that investors also benefit from overrated bonds.226 While 
the bond market may have its proverbial “moms and pops” and other 
unregulated investors, institutional investors are the major players. There is 
a real agency cost associated with the “dirty little secret.” Institutional 
investors and bond portfolio managers may desire a freer hand on 
investment choices, risk assumption, and desired yields on investments. 
This is not to suggest that bond investors like being fooled into bad 
investments. A credit rating is one important factor in determining the 
“true” value of a bond, but there are other factors that sophisticated 
investors can consider. As a number of commentators have noted, credit 
ratings do not always correlate with bond yields, credit, or CDS spreads.227 
The capital markets also incorporate information on the credit quality of a 
bond. This suggests that there is a tradeoff for some bond investors: a freer 
hand in pursuing greater yields on investments at the price of less accurate 
credit ratings. 
With all this said, the political picture is not so bleak. Even as some 
bond investors may have conflicting interests, many institutional investors 
actually rely on a credit rating system that provides broad coverage of the 
bond market.228 The flip side to the argument that there is an agency cost is 
that the fidelity of many agents is true to the principal. There are many 
institutional bond investors that desire a more accurate credit rating system. 
This is the premise of many proposals that would have a user- or 
subscriber-pay model, and their underlying assumption about the interests 
of many bond investors is not necessarily wrong. Long-term players in the 
bond market, such as insurance companies, rely on credit ratings. “Only a 
small subset of institutional investors have the ‘in-house’ capacity to 
undertake a serious analysis of the creditworthiness of debt securities, 
 
226 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
227 See Fitzpatrick & Sagers, supra note 7, at 592–608; Partnoy et al., supra note 7. 
228 See Coffee, supra note 7, at 263 (noting that “it is arguable that many sophisticated institutional 
investors relied on Moody’s and S&P because there was no one better to rely upon”). 
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while many funds compete by economizing on such expenses.”229 The bond 
market needs the credit rating system, and it is quite plausible that a 
sufficient subset of the bond investor community wants greater accuracy in 
credit ratings to offset some of the countervailing political pressures. 
Credit rating agencies exist because they provide a quantum of value 
in intermediating information in the capital markets and serve a quasi-
regulatory role. If the benefits of these functions were outweighed by the 
costs of a continuously compromised credit rating system, the future of 
rating agencies would be bleak. This is a possibility recognized by the 
rating agencies themselves,230 but this logic of utility and existence is not 
deductive conclusion. We must be aware that there is a powerful political 
coalition that has a significant economic interest in maintaining the status 
quo, inherent flaws and costs notwithstanding. 
CONCLUSION 
A lesson can be learned from legendary football coach Vince 
Lombardi, who taught his players: “Winning is not everything—but 
making the effort to win is.”231 This lesson is important in life, in markets, 
and in regulation. Credit rating agencies suffer from a lack of competition 
and a will to do better than other agencies, which diminishes the quality of 
credit ratings. If competition in fact does not exist, regulation should induce 
it. Large numbers of competitors are not needed to achieve robust, positive 
competition. Contrary to accepted wisdom, an industry of three firms can 
be competitive under the right conditions. The condition for competition is 
created when a portion of compensation is redirected from consideration 
for services rendered to pay for performance. This Article proposes a 
winner-take-all bonus scheme that augments the issuer-pay model. The 
same funding scheme can be used to increase further competition by 
incubating new and smaller rating agencies that would be allowed to 
participate in a bonus pool. The bonus pool need not be large relative to 
revenue. Even a modest, at-the-margin change can create the necessary 
conditions for robust, positive competition. 
A compelling rationale supports a mandated, hybrid public–private 
compensation scheme. Credit ratings are more than just the opinions of a 
private actor; they are a public good. Rating agencies enjoy a regulatory 
license that necessitates their service and gives them market status, and the 
credit rating system exists in a capital market that creates significant 
network externalities. Rating agencies are private firms that report to 
shareholders, but they also serve a public gatekeeping role. The main goal 
 
229 Coffee, supra note 7, at 263–64. 
230 See 2011 McGraw-Hill Form 10-K, supra note 183, at 9–10 (discussing increased regulation as 
a risk factor for the company); 2011 Moody’s Corporation Form 10-K, supra note 53, at 16–17 (same). 
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of regulation should be to change the incentives by altering the relationship 
among rating agencies. By mandating a self-funded bonus pool, each firm 
is forced to post a bond on good performance and a winner-take-all 
tournament is created. At least with respect to the bonus, rating agencies 
will not be oligopolists but will instead be competitors. A change in the 
relationship will change behavior. 
This proposal is economically and administratively feasible. Unlike 
other proposed reforms, it does not require a fundamental transformation of 
the industrial organization and regulatory framework. It maintains the 
duopoly plus industry organization and the issuer-pay model. This 
contrarian perspective is the proposal’s principal benefit. Under my 
proposal, it is fair to say that as much as 95% of the status quo would be 
preserved. The reform is economically feasible and administrable in a fair, 
coherent way. As with all reform of Wall Street, the greatest barrier to 
reform is the politics of regulation and the alignment of interests. In this 
regard, there would be a sufficient constituency of bond investors who 
would be interested in seeing an improvement in the quality of credit 
ratings as evinced by the passages of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
of 2006 and the provisions relating to rating agencies in the Dodd–Frank 
Act. Although these statutes did not fundamentally change the credit rating 
industry, they laid the foundation necessary to implement the reform 
proposal advanced in this Article. 
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